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Take my Life, and let it be 
Consecrated, Lord, to Thee 
Take my moments and my days; 
Let them flow in ceaseless praise. 
Take my hands, and let them move 
At the impulse of Thy love 
Take my feet, and let them be 
Swift and beautiful for Thee 
Take my voice, and let me sing 
Always, only, for my King. 
Take my lips and let them be 
Filled with messages for Thee. 
Take my silver and my gold; 
Not a mite would I withhold 
Take my intellect, and use 
Every power as Thou choose 
Take my will, and make it Thine 
It shall be no longer mine. 
Take my heart, it is Thine own; 
It shall be Thy toyal throne. 
Take my love, I pour 
At Thy feet its treasure-store. 
Take myself, and I will be 
Ever, only, all for Thee 
 








There is no spoon 
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S U M M A R Y  
 
The practice of selling a service in advance of consumption, such as those practiced 
by hotels and airlines, is not equivocal amongst academics. Literature in this area is scant 
and there is a good deal of ambiguity as to what drives pricing and capacity allocation 
considerations in advance, and if advanced selling is in fact optimal.  
In investigating this phenomenon, this dissertation presents three separate and 
complete essays on the subject. As each essay delves into different issues and draws 
separate conclusions pertaining to advanced selling, each is formulated with its own 
introduction, literature review, some background of the study, results, discussion and 
references.  
In the first chapter a qualitative study of various service firms is presented. 
Through a theory-in-use approach, the study re-constructs the tacit knowledge of 
practitioners to develop a greater understanding of how service firms actually sell their 
capacity. In-depth interviews with the top management of service firms were performed 
and the qualitative data were mapped to literature resulting in seven propositions on how 
capacity is marketed by the firms. From the propositions, the study concludes with an 
analysis of the domain of the capacity strategies and the motivations that drives their usage.  
The second chapter of the dissertation investigates, through a theoretical model, 
the optimality of advanced selling.  In the model, the firm determines the optimal prices 
and capacities for advanced sale, and for the time of consumption.  To examine how 
demand characteristics affect advanced sale of capacities, price sensitivity is incorporated in 
the model formulation. The study shows that, with advanced sale, capacity utilization and 
profits are higher than when advance selling is not undertaken. Furthermore, when price 
sensitivity at the point of consumption is low, it is optimal to allocate more capacity at the 
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time of consumption and less for advanced sale. However, although profits are greater, the 
optimal prices for advanced sale and at the time of consumption are lower, when price 
sensitivity at the point of consumption is low, than when price sensitivity is high.   
  The final chapter provides a deeper understanding of demand behavior and 
the pricing of services.  It argues why all services are sold in advance and show how the 
specificities of services result in two types of risks faced by buyers who buy in advance, that 
of unavailability of service and a low valuation of the service at the time of consumption. 
Furthermore, advanced buyers run the risk of not being able to consume at the time of 
consumption and this relinquished capacity may be re-sold by service firms. A theoretical 
model is developed that shows that advance prices are therefore always lower than spot 
prices. Also, providing a refund to advanced buyers may be optimal. Finally, the chapter 
shows a counter intuitive result that under certain conditions, the firm’s strategy may be 
pareto optimal in that a guarantee against capacity unavailability and a refund guarantee 
against valuation risk may be offered to advanced buyers at a lower advance price than if a 
refund offer is not provided.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF UNUSED SERVICE CAPACITY 
ABSTRACT 
 Services are by nature perishable. As such, managing a service firm's capacity to 
match supply and demand has been touted as one of the key problems of services 
marketing and management practice. This paper advances an alternative perspective of 
unused service capacity. Based on a review of current literature and an exploratory study, 
this paper employs a theory-in-use methodology to map out a set of capacity strategy 
propositions. These propositions show that unused capacity could be employed as a 
resource to achieve a series of strategic objectives that serve to improve the performance of 
the firm. The paper also suggests a re-look at capacity policies and proposes that service 
firms should therefore approach capacity management not only from the standpoint of 
operations management but from that of marketing as well. 
 




Services account for a growing percentage of the gross national output of most 
countries. As such, service industries are maturing and have become more competitive, and 
there is a growing need to increase efficiency, productivity and competitiveness (Wirtz, Lee 
and Mattila 1998). To that end, the capacity of service firms has to be managed to achieve 
maximum and/or optimum utilization at all times, if possible. 
Despite its importance, there has been a lack of attention devoted to the study of 
service capacity in the academic literature. Our field interviews indicated that managers in 
service firms face a complex and difficult task with regard to capacity management, and 
have less than adequate information to assist them. Furthermore, it is noted that there 
seems to be a divergence between what companies should do, according to academic 
literature, and what they are actually doing. This divergence seems to occur, because the 
literature often ignores the role of strategy when dealing with capacity issues. As 
competition intensifies, and despite a dearth in literature, many service firms have learned to 
survive by creating and innovating strategies with regard to capacity, which have not yet 
been explored in the academic literature. It is the purpose of this essay to map such 
practices, conducted in complex real world settings, and formalize the theory within which 
they operate through a theory-in-use methodology. 
 As this investigation deals with the role of unused capacity as a strategic resource 
for service firms, insufficient capacity to cope with overfull demand is not addressed here. 
This essay begins with a literature review on capacity management that will serve to 
illustrate the inadequacies of academic literature in providing solutions. Following on, the 
method section outlines the details of the exploratory investigation of thirty-six service 
firms and their practices of capacity usage. These interviews with the top management of 
the firms, mapping of their practices, coding and categorizing through a theory-in-use 
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methodology, generated qualitative data and, supplemented by academic literature, formed 
the basis for seven sets of propositions. The essay then closes with a discussion on the 
implications of the findings, study limitations and directions for future research. 
 
CAPACITY MANAGEMENT - A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Capacity of a service firm is "the highest quantity of output possible in a given time 
period with a predefined level of staffing, facilities and equipment" (Lovelock, 1992, p. 26). 
Capacity amongst service firms has one commonality. For each day a service is not put to 
profitable use, it cannot be saved (Bateson, 1977; Thomas, 1978). This perishability suggests 
a need for careful planning and management, as idle capacity due to slack demand, as well 
as turning away customers due to insufficient capacity, are serious problems critical to the 
success of many service firms (Harris & Peacock , 1995).  
 There is substantial literature on how to cope with supply and demand imbalances 
(e.g., Heskett, 1986; Lee, 1989; Lovelock, 1988; Mabert, 1986; Maturi, 1989; Morrall, 1986; 
Orsini and Karagozoglu, 1988; Sasser, 1976; Shemwell & Cronin, 1994). The literature 
suggests two ways of dealing with excess or idle capacity. The first is to manage supply to fit 
demand. Such strategies include reducing a firm's manpower costs, donating work to 
charity, conduct training for staff, schedule the service so as to match the peaks and the 
troughs, taking on sub-contracted jobs, and even reducing fixed costs such as renting office 
space or equipment. The second strategy, to manage demand to fit supply, include offering 
discounts, lowering prices, increasing advertising, conducting cold-calls, diversify to 
segments where demand is less fluctuating, selling services under barter arrangements, 
offering different services, positioning a service differently, accepting reservations, and even 
use idle staff as walking advertisements. However, if a firm chooses not to deal with the 
8 
problem, it can take the option to stay with a fixed capacity that is capable of handling peak 
business. 
  In sum, the current literature mainly proposes reducing/scheduling capacity, and 
increasing selling and promotion activities (‘chasing’ demand) or stay with a ‘level’ capacity 
(Sasser, 1976). 
 Yet despite such techniques suggested by literature to alleviate the problem, capacity 
management remains complex and troubling in management practice and serves as one of 
the principal problems in services marketing (Zeithaml, Parasuraman and Berry, 1985). 
 Problems of Capacity Management. Typically, the objective for many service 
firms is to develop a capacity profile to such an extent that it matches its demand profile 
and yet retain its economic viability. In a perfect situation, a service firm is able to cut 
capacity during low season and increase capacity during peak season. However, despite an 
optimum choice of capacity to the extent that there may be a close fit to the demand 
profile, demand forecasting is a skill rather than an exact science (Dilworth, 1992). 
Disequilibrium from other extraneous factors may blunt such forecasts' predictive 
capabilities. Finding use for idle capacity in such situations would be a marketer's 
conundrum.  
 Also, not all service firms are able to fit capacity to its demand profile. This is 
because services can rarely achieve consistent utilization of their capacity – unless they 
operate through appointments (Dilworth, 1992). Even then, idle capacity may still be 
maintained in anticipation of potential business. When demand fluctuations are intermittent 
and too short in duration and there exist constraints to scaling capacity up and down, many 
of the proposed techniques may not be workable. This is often true with many service 
companies within the leisure industry, for example, hotels and car rental companies. Many 
of these service firms experience high fixed capacity and high perishability, and their 
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profitability is largely tied to utilization (Allen, 1988). The result is usually a greater emphasis 
on short term gains and a myopic sales team, which strives to maximize yield during peak 
season and engaging in fierce price discounting to fill capacity during the low periods 
(Stone, 1990).  
 Moreover for certain services, idle capacity is required to make room for the 
variability of services to target to different market segments. Indeed, some estimates show 
that the quality of a services drops rapidly when demand exceeds even as little as 75% of 
the service firm's capacity (Heskett, 1986). This is because the comfort of other service 
users may be compromised, if the capacity of the service firm is used to the hilt. 
 Likewise, other services maintain some idle capacity as the availability of the 
services on-demand is necessary to establish and maintain service quality and the firm's 
differentiation efforts (Bassett, 1992). Examples of these services would include tow truck 
services, lift maintenance and other emergency services, or service companies that 
differentiate themselves through quality and short waiting times. For such services, 
unavailability or waiting for the service is invariably poor service, and many firms will set 
capacity utilization low enough to provide near instant service, or at least, where the level of 
service is competitive and satisfactory against industry standards. In such cases, excess 
capacity is deliberately maintained to justify its employment during peak times (Bassett, 
1992; Hope & Muhlemann, 1997). The question then arises as to what can be done about 
the excess capacity during low periods. 
 Capacity Management is Complex. Clearly, capacity management in services is 
not a simple issue. Traditionally, its dynamics has been relegated to the domain of logistics 
and operations management, a legacy of its counterpart in goods manufacturing. It is 
apparent, however, that service capacity management is far more complex. This complexity 
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is underlined in a service firm's inability to inventory its service as opposed to goods 
manufacturers that are able to do so when excess capacity arises. 
Furthermore, many services require the customer to be present for a service to be 
performed (e.g., Berry, 1987; Lovelock, 1983). Consequently, capacity management for 
services would affect the customer more than in the case of a manufacturing plant scaling 
up and down its capacity, since issues such as quality, waiting times, unavailability (i.e. 
marketing issues) are linked intricately to capacity. Normative research in services marketing 
has recognized this decentralization of the service marketing function (Gronroos, 1980 & 
1991; Gummesson, 1979 & 1991; Langeard et al., 1981), which involves issues relating to 
operations management and planning as well. 
 Understanding the complexities of services capacity management is only a start. To 
actually propose means of handling unused capacity is a different issue altogether, which, as 
demonstrated above, exist in some form or another in almost all service firms. 
Compounding this is the fact that some service industries have relatively low entry barriers 
(Normann, 1984). As such, new entrants would often create an excess capacity situation in 
the industry, at least in the short term.  In such instances, competition often intensifies, 
price wars are created and profitability is compromised (Porter, 1985). Although the 
strategies suggested in the current literature have some virtues, the defensive undertones of 
such strategies suggest an inclination toward mitigating losses, and do not adequately assist 
companies in tackling the problems of unused capacity. Indeed, this field interviews indicate 
that such techniques are not frequently used in many service firms. 
 The above highlights two major issues that are pressing concerns of service capacity 
management. First, unused capacity will exist, in some form or another. Second, techniques 
that are suggested by current literature are too limited to provide meaningful solutions. 
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 The objectives of this study are to ascertain first, how service firms deal with 
unused capacity in such a way so as to reduce its occurrence and its magnitude, and second, 
to map the actions undertaken. Such actions would then be compared against the literature 




 A few exploratory interviews conducted before the study was designed indicated 
that many service firms handle their unused capacity in very different ways. This divergence 
between practice and what the literature suggests is the backdrop against the reasons why a 
theory-in-use methodology seems warranted. 
 In their book ‘Theory Construction in Marketing: Some Thoughts on Thinking’, 
Zaltmann, LeMasters and Heffring (1982, p. 113) illustrate the fundamental concept of a 
theory-in-use approach: 
 "Practitioners……… are generally more concerned with informal theory based on everyday 
observations (versus controlled experiments), having less than precise concepts (versus explicit empirical 
referents), and being related to one another intuitively (versus in rigorous testable relationships). The informal 
theory built and maintained by practitioners in their everyday activities represent an important source of 
insight for the researcher concerned with formal theory. By mapping these informal theories and applying their 
own creativity, a researcher may gain insights into marketing phenomena which might not otherwise be 
obtained." 
 This methodology is therefore an exercise in reconstructed logic; mapping informal 
theory, linking with academic literature and developing a greater understanding of the 
phenomenon. The rationale for this approach, applied in this study, is embedded in the 
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pursuit of knowledge1, in the truest sense of the word. The purpose is to understand, 
formalize and document practitioners’ strategies in handling capacity as a contribution to 
academic literature. 
 A case study of a cruise line first provided the authors with insights on the various 
innovative usage of capacity. Although a single case study would still be relevant in this 
methodology (Zaltmann, LeMasters and Heffring, 1982), multiple subjects were 
subsequently chosen as a way of discovering patterns in their strategies, how they were 
commonly employed, and whether such strategies exist across a diverse range of service 
firms. It is to be noted that this approach involves considerable interaction with the 
individual subjects. Hence, in-depth interviews with the top management of thirty-six 
service firms in Malaysia and Singapore were performed. Table 1 shows the sample 
composition by industry. 
<Take in Table 1 > 
 The managers were carefully selected to ensure that they were from the firms’ 
senior management and had access to relevant information with regards to the firms’ 
capacity usage. Care was also taken to ensure that the manager chosen had access to 
meetings and decisions that would offer insights to the firms' reasons for such capacity 
usage.  As such, the managers interviewed in the sample mostly consist of top managers, i.e. 
CEOs and decisions makers in the firms.   For the purpose of this essay, what is of interest 
is how service companies deal with their unused capacity, the actions taken by the company 
to alleviate the problem, and the companies’ reasons for their actions. A review of existing 
literature was then performed. The combination of literature and the strategies employed by 
the firms were then developed into a set of propositions.  
                                                 
1 Knowledge, as defined by a well-known sociologist of knowledge, Burkart Holzner, is the mapping of experience reality 
by some observer (Zaltmann, LeMasters and Heffring 1982). 
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DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 In this section, a set of propositions on capacity related strategies is derived from 
findings from the study and supplemented with literature. The underlying concept of these 
capacity strategies seems to be the firms’ proactive intention of ensuring that a firm’s 
capacity is efficiently and productively utilized. The identified strategies were categorized 
into seven groups.  In particular, firms use service capacity for (1) customer development, 
(2) bundling, (3) pledging, (4) employee endowment, (5) exchanging, (6) entry deterrence, 
and (7) differentiation. Table 2 outlines each of the capacity strategies and the percentage of 
the thirty-six companies interviewed that practice these strategies.  
< Take in Table 2 > 
CAPACITY FOR CUSTOMER DEVELOPMENT 
 89% of service firms in this study use at least some of their capacity to develop 
customer relationships, either by (a) building loyalty, and/or by (b) providing trials. Of the 
89% companies that employ customer development strategies, 81% of the firms use some 
of their capacity to build loyalty, and 50% use capacity to allow customers to sample their 
services through free trials. 
 Customer Development by Building Loyalty. Many loyalty programs of service 
firms in this study utilize the firm’s capacity as an instrumental tool. For example, airlines 
give free tickets in exchange for the accumulation of miles through their frequent flier 
programs, and hotels give free room nights to their regular patrons. In less formal ways, 
many professional firms provide free advice and research to their regular clients. 
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 As it is discovered in this study, the use of capacity in building loyalty is perceived 
to be advantageous for at least four reasons. First, in some services, giving away such 
“freebies” may create a “snowball” effect that increases sales, as a customer who is given a 
loyalty-driven voucher may purchase additional services from the firm. For example, the 
traveler may travel with a friend or spouse, who will have to purchase another ticket. 
Second, giving away a service as a reward as opposed to cash invokes "images" or "mental 
pictures" that trigger emotional responses. A previous redemption of a loyalty-driven dinner 
voucher, for example, could have provided an evening of such vast enjoyment that a 
customer would attach a higher value to similar future rewards than mere cash.  Third, a 
customer may value a service according to its most visible price (for example, gross fare of 
an airline seat) and because the most visible price is usually a higher price, the customer 
feels that he has received a greater loyalty benefit (cf. Alonzo, 1996). Finally, the company 
attains cost efficiency from providing capacity as a reward as opposed to giving other 
loyalty rewards that may need to be purchased.  
 Customer development through trials. Some service firms in this sample use 
capacity to provide potential customers with 'trials' that allow customers to experience the 
service before making a purchase decision. For example, the health club in this study runs 
programs for members to bring along a friend to try out their facilities. Such trials are 
always conducted carefully and closely monitored by the firms to ensure that there is no 
abuse. Netscape new beta version browsers, for example, could be sampled for two weeks 
before the software automatically expire and all its functions disabled.  
 Trials are also useful for developing channel relationships. In this study, agents 
selling into a new tourism product, such as a theme park, or a new destination, are often 
invited for free 'familiarization trips'. These familiarization trips are not merely incentives. 
They serve to amplify the agent’s ability to sell the service in their home markets. One of 
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the cruise lines in this study hosted a familiarization cruise for wholesalers and agents in five 
countries to develop new markets.  
 Of course, not all services are capable of providing such trials. It would not be 
possible for hospitals, for example, to provide trials of their services. 
 Summary of capacity for customer development. The preceding discussion is 
summarized in the following three propositions: 
 
Proposition 1a: Unused capacity can be utilized to develop customer loyalty. 
Proposition 1b:  Unused capacity can be employed to develop new customers. 
Proposition 1c:  Unused capacity can be employed to develop new channels of distribution. 
CAPACITY FOR BUNDLING 
 In this study, 83% of the firms set aside capacity to practice bundling as a strategy. 
Although bundling is used as a strategy for most of the service firms, this study discovered 
that there are different purposes why companies bundle. Our investigation isolated five 
purposes of bundling, and the proportion of the service companies driven by each purpose 
is shown in Table 2. Many firms cite multiple purposes for bundling. Before discussing each 
of the observed bundling strategies for utilizing capacity, a brief review on the literature for 
bundling is provided below. 
 Background on Bundling Literature. Bundling is the parceling of two or more 
products, and marketing them at a discounted price. Service companies have long practiced 
the concept of bundling. Airline seats are bundled with tours and hotel accommodation, 
audit firms bundle auditing with company secretarial services, and advertising agencies 
bundle their creative talents with media buying services. Pure bundling is the offer of two or 
more services at a package price but does not provide the option of purchasing the 
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individual services separately, i.e. in their unbundled form. Conversely, pure component 
selling is the selling of individual services in their unbundled state.  
 Whilst bundling strategies can serve as a powerful tool to a firm’s marketing efforts, 
there may be arguments against its use. Switching from pure components to bundling may 
result in a potential loss in revenue. Customers who wish to buy a service individually may 
not be so inclined to purchase the bundled services. Furthermore, customers who already 
have had intention of buying the bundled services as individual services will now enjoy a 
lower price, and the service firm would have lost the additional margin it would have earned 
otherwise (Guiltinan, 1997; Venkatesh & Mahajan, 1993). However, employing mixed 
bundling can circumvent some of these limitations. Mixed bundling provides the customer 
with both options, i.e. allowing them to choose whether to purchase the services in a 
bundle or individually (Schmalensee, 1984). Prices of services (whether sold individually or 
as a bundle) can be simultaneously optimized through mixed bundling in such a way that 
the service firm's profit can be increased over and above the expected profit than if the 
services were sold on a pure component basis (Adams & Yellen, 1976; Schmalensee, 1984; 
Venkatesh & Mahajan, 1993; Yadav & Monroe, 1993).  
 With mixed bundling providing greater revenue as compared to selling products in 
their pure form, a service firm can set aside some of its capacity for the purpose of bundling 
with other services. Our study showed that the motivation for service firms to bundle is 
largely due to the strategic benefits obtained from it. Such benefits include bundling for 
improving service performance (mentioned by 90% of all the firms that reported to bundle 
to utilize unused capacity; see Table 2); for increasing demand (60%); for segmenting 
markets (60%); for reducing a service firm's selling risk (47%); for cost reduction (37%); 
and for obscuring discounts (33%).  
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 Bundling to provide better service value. Using part of a firm's capacity for 
bundling, in some cases, offers better service value and thus creates differentiation. Our 
study showed that an overwhelming 90% of companies that bundle, cite providing 
customers with better service and greater value as a strategy for bundling.  
 For example, in providing customized software services, many companies bundle 
their customized software services with support services to ensure satisfaction from the 
software’s proper usage.  
 For many professional service firms in this study, such as legal and engineering 
firms, bundling with other services is often performed, because their clients only wish to 
deal with one single company or person to get the job done. Hence, the professional firm, 
such as an engineering firm, would not only offer its’ capacity to provide a direct service to 
a client but would bundle some of its’ capacity with other service firms, such as soil 
investigation and surveying, to market itself as a 'total solution' provider. For marine and 
port services, bundling various services together provides for better coordination, especially 
over time, when increase in bundled sales fosters closer relationships between the service 
firms and their bundling partners. From the customers’ perspective, the availability of 
bundled services can sizably reduce search costs, providing them with the convenience of a 
‘one-stop-shop’.  
 Bundling to increase demand. Aside from providing better service value to 
customers, setting aside capacity for bundling was also used by 60% of firms that bundle in 
this study to increase demand. Through bundling, two products become a new 'bundled' 
product. If the two products are independent in demand, some customers who would buy 
only one of the products, if they were priced separately, will now buy both in the form of 
the bundle. The reason for this is that the value some customers place on one product is so 
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much greater than its price that the combined value of the two products exceeds the 
bundled price (Guiltinan, 1987).  
 During the financial turmoil in Asia, Malaysians were willing to pay and subscribe to 
a bundle of 20 Cable Channels provided by ASTRO, the Malaysian Cable TV Distributor, 
although the demand was predominantly driven by the need for financial news information 
from CNN and CNBC Asia. ASTRO sold the cable channels through pure bundling and 
channels were not available for subscription individually.  
 Additionally, 'trade-up bundling' was used by some firms in this study, whereby 
various bundles are created with a slightly higher bundled price. Each higher price bundle 
includes an additional service and some enticement to motivate customers to 'trade-up' to 
the next bundle. For example, one health club in this study offered a higher discount for the 
purchase of a bigger bundle, comprising of facial, massage and manicure, as compared to a 
lower discount for the purchase of a bundle comprising of facial and massage only. 
 Likewise, a customer, who is interested in buying a service from a service firm, is 
given a discount to purchase not merely the service itself, but a bundle of other services 
within the firm. This serves to increase customers' switching costs and reduce their 
motivation to try a service elsewhere (Eppen, Ward and Martin, 1991). As one manager in 
this study describes it, bundling assist the firm to get a "foot in the door so that it's easier to 
get the other foot in". By being a client's tax adviser, for example, an accounting firm can 
bundle tax consultation with regular year-end auditing services. 
 Bundling to facilitate reduction in selling risk. It was found that setting aside 
capacity for bundling offered, in many cases, an opportunity to lower the firm's selling risk 
(47% of the firms that use a bundling strategy). As the threat of perishability in services is 
high, service firms endeavor to lower their selling risk. In this study, some service firms find 
that by marketing their service in a bundled form, the bundle provides the firm with a 
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discrimination tool to lower prices and target a segmented market that is willing to buy the 
service in advance. Thus, bundling facilitates a firm’s attempts to reduce selling risk without 
cannibalizing existing pricing structures (cf. Venkatesh & Mahajan, 1993). This is the case 
for many airlines. Through bundling and targeting customers who are willing to purchase in 
advance, they are able to sell their seats in advance to tour operators.  
 Bundling to reduce marketing costs. A bundling strategy serves to reduce 
marketing costs and provide scope economies for 37% of firms that use bundling. As the 
cost structure of many service businesses is characterized by a high level of cost sharing (cf. 
Dearden, 1978), the marginal costs associated with marketing and selling additional services 
to customers are often lower in comparison to the service firm's total cost (Guiltinan, 
1987). As such, some service firms set aside some of their capacity for bundling to obtain 
reduction in marketing costs. A hotel that sells its membership programs, which are 
bundled forms of hotel services such as health clubs, food and beverage and rooms, gain 
from lower marketing and selling costs per service when the customers buy into the 
program. 
 Bundling to obscure discounts. In this study, 33% of the service firms that 
bundle use it as a strategy to obscure discounts (cf. Guiltinan, 1987).  Service firms that 
have low capacity utilization and are yet unwilling to engage in a price war to sell capacity 
may be willing to reduce their price when selling through bundles. This can be done to the 
extent that a customer/competitor, who tries to ascertain the precise discounts provided by 
the services in the bundle, end with inconclusive information. This strategy is commonly 
employed in multi-service companies, who are willing to impart their unused capacity to 
cross sell at hefty discounts to obtain a larger market share. For example, the cruise line, as a 
subsidiary of a major corporation, bundled cruises with a sister service firm (a hotel) with 
both providing discounted rates to develop an overseas market coming in on a fly-cruise-
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stay program. The total bundled price was only marginally higher than the list price of the 
flight portion, which gave the perception that the cruise and the hotel were free.  
 Interestingly, in Malaysia where the airline industry is regulated and fare controls 
exist to the extent that penalties are imposed on airlines and agents who undersell to the 
market, selling airline seats in a bundle can serve to obscure discounts given to the extent 
that an airline can sidestep such fare control regulations. In another example, the cruise line 
casino in this study provided free air tickets and cruise for passengers, who were prepared 
to exchange a pre-determined sum of money for casino gaming chips.  
 Summary of capacity for bundling. From this study, it can be seen that setting 
aside a firm's capacity for bundling is a common strategy amongst service firms. Our 
interviews indicated that while some service firms sold their services completely through 
bundling, the proportion of capacity that is sold in that manner for most of the service 
firms ranges from 5% to 50%. The preceding discussion is summarized in the following set 
of propositions: 
 
Proposition 2a:  Unused capacity can be used for bundling to provide better service value. 
Proposition 2b:  Unused capacity can be used for bundling to increase demand. 
Proposition 2c:  Unused capacity can be used for bundling to reduce a firm's selling risk. 
Proposition 2d:  Unused capacity can be used for bundling to reduce marketing costs. 
Proposition 2e:  Unused capacity can be used for bundling to obscure discounts. 
CAPACITY FOR EMPLOYEE ENDOWMENT 
 In this study, some service firms use capacity to endow employees and build loyalty 
and commitment within the company. Setting aside capacity for endowing employees is a 
capacity strategy, which if structured appropriately, can serve to be a powerful tool to 
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reduce staff turnover. In examining the use of capacity for endowing employees, this study 
found that 64% of service firms interviewed provide free or discounted services to their 
employee (Table 2). 
 Background literature on the service employee. The quality of a service is 
often highly dependent on the people that deliver it. Back in the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
little emphasis was placed on the service employees. The mindset of service management 
then was to design quick and impersonal services, maximizing usage of facilities and 
reducing any possible individualistic intervention that could disrupt the flow of the 
operation. As competition intensified in the late 1980s and 1990s, a new service model 
emerged - that of putting service employees first, investing in, and finding ways to motivate 
them (Schlesinger & Heskett, 1991). These human resource strategies often increase 
personnel costs, although if implemented appropriately, can indeed provide high returns on 
investment. A firm's capacity can, through employee endowment practices, serve not only 
to lessen the cost burden, but also be utilized pro-actively to reduce staff turnover. 
 Endowing to reduce staff turnover. 64% of service firms in this study utilize 
capacity to endow employees. For the larger service firms in this sample, such as the 
airlines, cruise lines and hotels, formal policies on staff endowment exist, and some have 
developed their endowment programs to highly sophisticated levels.  
 The cruise line in this study sets aside approximately 10% of its cruises for its in-
house endowment scheme, and has a discount program running within the organization. 
While the employee and his or her spouse can cruise for free, discount levels exist for 
immediate and extended family members. A lower level of discount is extended even to the 
employee's guests – as long as the employee cruises together with them. The management 
feels that this practice has brought many of the employees together and creates a better 
working environment. "We are happy when our staff wants to cruise. They become more 
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involved with the product, and they become more committed towards the preservation of 
service quality on board," said the line's Vice President for Operations. "And when you 
bring your family and friends along, and your colleagues get to meet them, it's more 
personal and we become like one happy family – which goes a long way to building loyalty 
and commitment."  
 Airline endowment programs are also common within the industry. Free tickets for 
staff and family are perceived to contribute strongly to employee retention. Similarly, this 
study discovered that endowment perks, whether formal or informal, were commonly 
practiced for other service firms as well, from the availability of low interest loans to bank 
staff, free meals for restaurant staff to free post-natal programs for health club employees 
who are pregnant. Such endowment schemes although generally applied to unused capacity 
during the low periods, serve to motivate employees and are used to reduce staff turnover.  
 Summary of capacity for endowment. It is important to note that the remaining 
36% of the companies do not practice using capacity for endowment primarily because 
these companies were performing industrial or professional services, such as port, 
advertising, engineering and architectural services, whereby endowing their employees with 
these services are not relevant. This would suggest that almost all consumer service firms 
use capacity to practice some form of endowment – although many of the smaller service 
firms admitted that such practices were ad-hoc and there were no formal policies on the 
matter. With committed and motivated staff, staff turnover is effectively reduced. Lower 
staff turnover, in turn, reduces learning curve effects, which can contribute to better service 
performance. The preceding discussion is summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3:  Unused capacity can be utilized to increase staff motivation and loyalty. 
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CAPACITY FOR EXCHANGING 
 Some service firms exchange a portion of their capacity.  In this study, 53% of 
service companies interviewed used their capacity to participate in some form of exchange 
(see Table 2). Of these, 79% exchange capacity to reduce cost, 53% to extend their existing 
product range, 42% to reduce selling risk, and 26% of the service firms exchange capacity 
to improve yield. 
 Exchanging capacity for cost reduction. A substantial part of the promotional 
strategies for Internet giants, such as Netscape, Yahoo! and Excite, centers around the 
bartering of capacity on their web sites. Out of a total expenditure of $5.7m on web 
advertising by Netscape in 1996, it is estimated that 60% of it was on barter. Says Scott 
Epstein, the director of marketing communications with Excite, "No one is selling 100% of 
inventory. There is excess space, so why not put it to use through some sort of barter deal?" 
(Advertising Age, March 24, 1997, p. 26).  
 In this study, it was interesting to note that bartering capacity has taken on new 
levels of sophistication. Airlines barter their capacity for advertisements in magazines, 
promotional campaigns with travel agents, and even for entertainment expenses. For 
example, it is accepted practice in Asia for airlines and agent executives to socialize and 
conduct businesses outside the office – often on the golf course. As golfing is expensive, 
with a round of golf often costing US$100 per person, one airline barters tickets (a portion 
of its capacity on selected flights) for a pre-determined number of rounds of golf a month, 
which the company executives utilize to entertain agents and clients. The golf club, 
consequently, uses the tickets for members' inter-club competitive trips overseas or as 
prizes for in-house competitions - and is strictly prohibited from re-selling these tickets. 
 Exchanging capacity for extending product range. In this study, 53% of the 
service firms that exchange capacity are motivated by product extensions. For example, in 
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1995 Virgin Atlantic Airways signed a code share agreement with Malaysia Airlines (MAS). 
Under this agreement, MAS is able to increase its number of flights on a congested route 
from 8 to 14 fights per week. With the increased capacity, MAS expected revenues to 
increase by 30% to 40%. In exchange for the right to operate the additional flights, MAS 
allocates a portion of its increased capacity to Virgin Airways. Although technically 11 
flights are to be operated by MAS and 3 by Virgin, all 14 flights were actually operated by 
MAS with Virgin given an allocation of seats for each of the 14 flights. Flight numbers are 
shared and a Virgin Airways attendant is on board for each of the flights. By exchanging 
capacity for traffic rights, MAS increased its revenue and Virgin expanded its services with a 
new route and higher frequency at minimal costs (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
1995).  
 Similar agreements allow for other innovative capacity strategies. One example 
which surfaced during the course of this study revealed that by exchanging some of its 
capacity on a domestic route with another country's airline, the local airline is able to fly 
passengers from its capital into domestic points of the other country and vice versa. Thus, 
both airlines are able to extend their services to more destinations, even if they do not fly 
those routes themselves. 
 Even among ocean liners, alliances to exchange capacity have expanded rapidly 
over the past few years to the extent that these pacts have now covered many lanes in the 
global shipping network (Bradley, 1995). 
 Exchanging capacity for higher yield. In this study, 26% of the firms that use 
capacity to exchange claim to do so to facilitate yield management2.  
 The concept of overbooking in this modern age of yield management is not 
uncommon amongst service firms, especially in the airline business. This concept entails a 
                                                 
2 Yield Management is defined as “maximizing the profitability of a [service] through 
manipulation of its pricing and booking policies’ (Badinelli & Olsen 1990). 
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service firm taking in customers' bookings to a level that exceeds its capacity in anticipation 
of customers who fail to turn up at the last minute. In the past, such overbooking 
tendencies have been under great scrutiny and criticism by consumers and government to 
the extent that in 1978, the US Civil Aeronautics Board decreed a plan to reduce the 
number of passengers being 'bumped' (the act of denying a customer a seat, which he has 
had a reservation for). The number of 'bumps' since then have been greatly reduced due to 
airlines providing incentives to customers who volunteer to wait for a later flight (Simon, 
1994). Hence, an airline could exchange future or alternative capacity (at a discount) to free 
up existing capacity for customers who are willing to pay more. This 'voluntary bumping' 
has served to increase efficiency in capacity utilization for the airline and greater value to 
passengers. 
 For hotels that overbook, housing some of the overbooked guests in other nearby 
hotels is a commonplace strategy, as it was discovered in this study. Providing some of one 
hotel's capacity for the other hotel that has overbooked in exchange for a portion of the 
latter's capacity should the same problem arise with the former hotel assist both parties in 
improving their yields and gaining higher revenue.  
 Summary of exchanging capacity. Although the exchange of service capacity is 
not a new concept, it is surprising that little academic literature has focused on it. Notable 
contributions focus on bartering and acknowledge that bartering allows for much more 
creativity than cash deals and should be viewed as an opportunity (Vaccaro and Kassaye, 
1997). In 1992, bartering for advertising amounted to $3 billion in the United States (cf. 
Lundberg, 1992). It is to be noted, however, that some service firms admitted to exchanging 
capacity as a last resort, when they were unable to receive payment for the services 
rendered. As this was not a deliberate strategy and so as not to confound the data, such 
responses were not taken in as part of the percentage of companies practicing capacity 
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exchange strategies. The preceding discussion is summarized in the following set of 
propositions.: 
Proposition 4a:  Unused capacity can be utilized to reduce a firm’s cost. 
Proposition 4b:  Unused capacity can be utilized to extend a firm’s product range. 
Proposition 4c:  Unused capacity can be utilized to improve a firm's yield. 
CAPACITY FOR PLEDGING 
 An innovative capacity strategy of pledging was practiced by 39% of companies in 
this study (see Table 2). By pledging some of their capacity to channel intermediaries, 
service firms display their commitment to the relationship, and thereby reduce potential 
opportunism. Before discussing the observed pledging strategy, a brief review on the 
literature of distribution channels for services is provided below. 
 Background on Service Distribution Channels and Transaction Cost 
Theory. Careful analyses of the interviews conducted in this study suggest that service 
distribution channels are often difficult to establish for various reasons. The nature of 
services - their intangibility, inseparability, perishability, and heterogeneity make it difficult 
to relate how the "distribution" of a service can be accomplished (Light, 1986). 
 Service intangibility creates problems for the marketer, as not only potential buyers 
are not able to see or touch the services before consumption, but channel intermediaries 
would also have the same problem. Thus, the role of channel intermediaries in services tend 
to be more complicated than their counterparts in goods distribution, as service 
intermediaries have to convey the idea and the quality of the service to the consumer. As 
Stone (1990, p. 88) puts it, "How can you rely on the agency to position your product 
properly, particularly when perceptions and promise are the essence of selling?" To reduce 
problems associated with intangibility, services channel intermediaries have to be well 
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trained and equipped to sell the service and convey the quality of the service to its fullest 
degree. Hence, they would need to invest in some measure of human assets specificity, to 
borrow the term from transaction cost theory. 
 The inseparability of many services of production and consumption may imply that 
direct sale is the only option and channel intermediaries may not be required. However, 
many services distribute a tangible representation of the service with a promise that the 
service will become available for consumption at some future time or date, for example, 
through an airline ticket, a hotel voucher or a meal coupon. 
 The heterogeneity of services may result in dissatisfied customers, and thus strain 
the relationship between channel intermediaries and the service firm. Problems of service 
heterogeneity would thus rely on the strength of the relationship between channel members 
for their solution. 
 Perishability of services also creates potential problems. In the effort to maximize 
yield and reduce unused capacity, many service firms practice yield management and 
multiple pricing. Channel intermediaries may find that the service may not be available at 
certain times and prices for the same service can vary, resulting in confusion and higher 
transaction costs for channel participants. Such problems could be solved, if channel 
intermediaries can be guaranteed of a service's availability at a pre-determined price, which 
may not be in the interest of the service supplier as he is eager to improve yields. 
 It is obvious that the unique characteristics of services serve to compound the 
difficulties in establishing a meaningful relationship between service firms and their 
intermediaries.  As such, these relationships are often fraught with conflicts, which in turn, 
give rise to intermediary opportunism (Light, 1986; Stone, 1990). In this study, some 
intermediaries (travel agents, for example) attribute the lack of a credible commitment from 
the principal as a main cause for such conflicts. Without a credible commitment, many 
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agents do not feel sufficiently assured to invest in assets required to build the channel 
relationship. On the other hand, tourism suppliers are apprehensive in giving commitment, 
as they believe the agent will act in an opportunistic way, once a market is established. 
 Pledging Capacity to reduce opportunism. Anderson and Weitz (1992, p. 20) 
define pledges as "actions undertaken by channel members that demonstrate good faith and 
bind the channel members to the relationship. Pledges are more than simple declarations of 
commitments or promises to act in good faith. They are specific actions binding a channel 
member to a relationship." 
 Consistent with literature, these studies discovered that the tourism industry has 
been using capacity as a form of a pledge. Tourism suppliers, such as airlines and hotels, 
often provide agents a portion of their capacity as a form of commitment. Such 
commitments, often called 'allotments', are given to specific channel intermediaries, who are 
able to display their commitment in return to the supplier, for example, by expending some 
advertising and promotion funds in the market to promote the supplier's service, or sending 
their staff for adequate training (human asset specificity). As an example, a hotel in 
Singapore may provide a wholesaler in Japan with guaranteed allotment of rooms per night. 
The wholesaler, in turn, mounts a promotional program in the Japanese market for the 
hotel. With a guaranteed allotment (usually by way of a binding contract), the wholesaler 
can be assured of the supplier's commitment to his market, and the service provider gains 
the assurance of the wholesaler's investment.  
 Often, tourism suppliers would introduce further safeguards, such as formalization 
procedures3, which would dictate the date when the capacity pledged to the wholesaler is 
released back to the supplier within a 'cut-off period' (i.e. the number of days before a 
service is to be performed). With formalization, transacting parties are more assured of each 
                                                 
3 Formalization is the extent to which explicit rules and procedures regulate the behavior of 
the firms involved in the relationship (Dwyer and Oh 1987). 
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other's behavior, and such predictability fosters the relationship. Research has shown that 
formalization procedures reduce opportunism and increase the effectiveness of the 
relationship (Dahlstrom, Dwyer and Chandrashekaran, 1995).  
 This study show that for some service firms, formalization procedures dictating the 
cut off date when the pledged capacity is released back to the supplier, can be as long as one 
to two months from the actual date of service performance. Such an imposition would 
allow suppliers to put other potential customers on waiting lists and confirm them with the 
capacity released by wholesalers, who were unable to fill their allotments by the cut off 
dates. Consequently, even though some may argue that pledging capacity with a guarantee 
of sale may be too risky, wait-listing potential customers (a form of inventorying demand), 
who will purchase capacity released after cut off date, will substantially reduce that risk, 
while still giving the service firm the benefits of the pledge. 
 The Asian cruise line in this study extended this concept further with a rather 
innovative deal involving the use of capacity. In their effort to expand their network into 
Australia, a marketing plan was drawn up. The total cost was estimated to be US$60,000. 
This cost was split sixty-forty between the cruise line and the Australian wholesaler. 
However, the wholesaler was obligated to fund 100% of the amount up front and 
redeemed the 60% progressively over the year as sales materialized. The cruise line provided 
a guaranteed allotment of cabins; some form of service specificity on board the vessel 
specifically for the Australian market and total exclusivity to the wholesaler. Procedures for 
reservations were formalized with a twenty-one day cut off period so that any capacity not 
sold by the date was returned and sold to wait-listed customers from other market 
segments. The implementation of the marketing plan in Australia was monitored closely by 
both parties. With this deal, the cruise line was able to reduce the cost of market 
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development, whilst the wholesaler was assured of the line's commitment to invest in the 
relationship.  
 Summary of capacity for pledging. Developing and maintaining distribution 
channels for services is a daunting task. As service industries are so diverse, their 
distribution channels development can differ to a large degree, and there seem to be no 
traditional channels to model after. The channels of distribution for a bank (for example, 
withdrawing money from an ATM) would differ greatly from that of a health club or an 
airline, although within the hospitality industry, there may be greater similarities.  
 Pledging capacity as a strategy to build channel relationships is a useful tool for 
many tourism service suppliers, as the sales mix for these service firms are often so 
geographically diverse that their limited marketing budgets tend to be ineffective.  By 
pledging capacity, new markets can also be developed at lower costs. The preceding 
discussion is summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Unused capacity can be utilized to develop new markets. 
CAPACITY FOR ENTRY DETERRENCE 
 Capacity can be used as a tool for entry deterrence. As the danger of new entrants 
into an industry threatens the profits of the incumbent within (Yip, 1982), the deterrence of 
new entrants is of paramount importance, and in fact strategies for entry deterrence often 
rank equal in importance as all other strategic decisions (Smiley, 1988). This study shows 
that 25% of service firms interviewed expand their capacity to deter new entrants. 
 Academic literature argues that one of the strategies available to incumbents is to 
build enough capacity to lower prices (Gruca and Sudharashan, 1995). Hence, whether 
increasing the number of staff or building a new hotel wing, the incumbent should be able 
to increase capacity with lower marginal costs. With an irreversible capacity choice and 
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hence creating exit barriers for itself, the incumbent signals its capability of constantly 
increasing outputs to lower prices to a level, whereby it may not be commercially viable for 
potential new entrants to enter the market (Wenders, 1971).  
Gruca and Sudharashan also commented that using capacity to deter new entrants is most 
effective in industries characterized by high fixed costs, large economies of scale and high 
producer concentration - traits exhibited by many service industries, such as hotels and 
airlines (cf. Thomas, 1978).  
 In this study, one airline expanded the capacity on certain routes to ensure that 
other carriers do not enter the market. Although the yield on that route might have been 
high, the airline deliberately created excess capacity and lowered its fares to deter other 
airlines from flying. This strategy was also extended to maintaining idle capacity when 
demand was slack (for example, three weekly flights to a destination were maintained 
instead of reducing it to two).  In this case, the reasoning was to deter entry as well as an 
added benefit of retaining the flight slots (i.e. the time slot for landing allocated by the 
authorities at the destination), since relinquishing a time slot may allow potential 
competitors to take it over. 
 Similarly, a Malaysian telecommunication company invested heavily into expanding 
their network into as many geographical areas as possible, although the markets in these 
geographical regions may not yet be well established. Using capacity, and pricing the service 
at lower rates, the firm aggressively deterred any potential new entrant from entering these 
markets. 
 Many other people-based service businesses, such as consulting and professional 
firms, do not enjoy the benefit of capital as an entry deterrent. Although barriers can still be 
erected by way of service differentiation or developing proprietary technology (see Thomas, 
1978), capacity is an alternative. An engineering firm that specializes in governmental 
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infrastructure development claims to have a sizable share of the market. To maintain that 
share, the firm is careful to hire more people and yet quote at competitive prices to ensure 
that there is no incentive for new firms to enter and compete in that particular segment. 
 Interestingly, it is also found that the motive to expand capacity is not merely to 
deter new entrants into the industry but to deter existing firms from entering a particular 
segment of the market. 
 The preceding discussion is summarized in the following set of propositions: 
Proposition 6a:  Unused capacity can be utilized to deter entry into a market segment. 
Proposition 6b:  Unused capacity can be utilized to deter entry into an industry. 
CAPACITY FOR DIFFERENTIATION 
 Capacity is also used as a tool to deliberately differentiate on quality. By keeping 
some capacity idle, customers enjoy greater comfort when consuming a service. 
Additionally, setting aside capacity often provides improved customer satisfaction through 
lower waiting times. Out of the thirty-six firms interviewed, 13% reported to deliberately 
keeping idle capacity for these purposes. 
The rationale for keeping idle capacity for differentiation is rooted the inseparability of 
services, i.e. the simultaneous production and consumption of a service. For many service 
firms, this inseparability implies that other customers can directly affect a customer’s 
evaluation of a service (Bitner, Booms and Tetreault, 1990). For example, customers at a 
restaurant may not enjoy the service (even if the food is good), if the table next to them is 
making too much noise, or if their neighbors get involve in a drunken brawl. Likewise, a 
hotel guest may not be able to sleep well, if the nocturnal activities of the guest in the next 
room keep him awake all night. Whilst capacity may not eliminate such problems from 
occurring, it can reduce the impact of the problem. For example, the restaurant patron can 
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be moved to another table and the hotel guest shifted to another room – subject to 
available capacity. 
 In this study, a corporate weekly newspaper deliberately set editorial/advertisement 
ratio below industry norm, despite a potential loss in advertising revenue, for the purpose of 
maintaining less advertising clutter and thereby projecting a higher quality. The private 
hospital, maintains idle capacity for emergency purposes, whereas the health club keeps 
some 20% of capacity idle for the purpose of their members' comfort (a crowded aerobics 
session is a bane to members).  
 Furthermore, research shows that waiting for service negatively affects customers’ 
evaluation of a service (Taylor, 1994). This was evident in an interview with a golf club, 
where despite potential loss in revenue, golf tee off times were kept ten minutes apart 
(against the industry standard of eight minutes), so that golfers did not need to wait too 
long between shots. 
The preceding discussion is summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 7:  Unused capacity can be utilized to enhance service quality. 
 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 In the preceding sections, how service firms use capacity as a resource has been 
examined and the various capacity utilization strategies has been outlined.  A summary form 
of the capacity strategies is provided in Figure 1.  
< Take in Figure 1 > 
 The findings indicated that whilst the capacity strategies of Customer Development 
and Employee Endowment, Entry Deterrence and Differentiation often use unused 
capacity, the capacity strategies of Bundling, Exchanging and Pledging are not directly 
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applied on unused capacity. The firms, in fact, set aside a certain portion of their capacity in 
advance to employ these strategies. This is, in part, due to the benefits that can be obtained 
from the strategies but also due to a difference in time. As the firms may not be able to 
predict how much of their capacity will be unused at a certain future time, they preempt 
such possibility by committing a portion their capacity in advance through the employment 
of these strategies. This need for insurance due to the perishable nature of services, drive 
the capacity strategies just as it drives the concepts of reservations and overbooking. 
 It is interesting to note that what originally started as a study on service firms and 
how they handled their unused capacity, seems to have obtained quite unexpected results. 
Along the course of this study, it has been discovered that many firms take a different 
approach towards capacity management, versus what some of the literature have suggested, 
namely, increasing selling activities and reducing capacity costs.  
 Specifically from the point of view of managing demand to match supply, many 
companies do not wish to pursue active discounting or increasing advertising and 
promotion activities to promote capacity utilization. Such moves are feared to impact 
negatively on marketing plans that have already been set in place. However, some service 
firms that are able to accept advance sales, such as airlines and hotels, do practice 
reservations to diminish the impact of unused capacity, often in tandem with the capacity 
strategies. 
 From the point of view of managing supply to fit demand, this findings indicate 
that the scheduling of services was not a way to curb unused capacity but merely to mitigate 
losses. Even then, many firms admitted that the amounts saved are small as compared to 
the actual loss of income derived from the capacity that is unused. Hence, it would seem 
that firms are generally more keen in setting a ‘level capacity’ whilst employing the capacity 
strategies to strategically consume the unused capacity.  
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 It can therefore be seen that the focus of these firms where capacity is concerned, is 
to act proactively to preempt and reduce the occurrence and magnitude of unused capacity. Hence this 
study suggests a divergence between academic literature and practice in so far as the focus 
and approach towards capacity management is concerned. In light of this, there is a need to 
shift current academic emphasis on capacity management and address the issue in a more 
proactive manner (cf. Bassett, 1992). 
 The striking factor in this study is that these proactive strategies utilize capacity 
itself as a strategic resource to improve business performance. This seems particularly 
advantageous for small and medium service enterprises, where resource constraints are a 
major obstacle in developing their businesses (cf. Donald et al., 1991; Lee, Wee and Chia, 
1997).  
 A Possible Domain for Capacity Strategies. From the findings and the 
propositions developed in this essay, it is interesting to discover the underlying reasons 
behind the use of these capacity strategies. What are the reasons behind the changing of a 
firm’s perspective about capacity to the extent that solutions from literature is less practiced 
and capacity strategies thrive in its stead? Do these benefits provide a better outcome as 
opposed to suggestions from literature?  
 While this essay does not address the above questions, a few are advanced as 
arguments and as a possible justification for the domain under which these strategies would 
prevail and the contextual nature of their existence.  
 Since capacity strategies are not known to be commonly practiced by goods 
marketing firms (with entry deterrence being an exception), the answer to the first question 
may possibly rest in the unique characteristics of services. 
 First, the perishable nature of services has various implications on capacity. For a 
service firm that has a capacity to perform a certain level of output on a particular date, 
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unused capacity cannot be stored for use on a later date. In other words, services have no 
salvage value. This perishable nature of services drives service firms toward a greater urgency to 
maximize sales forward. This sense of urgency may therefore be a driving force to some of the 
proposed capacity strategies. 
 Second, the intangible and inseparable natures of service are also likely to impact on 
capacity strategies. Intangibility and inseparability could possibly drive service firms toward a 
greater need to reduce perceive risk of purchase both by customers and by channel intermediaries. 
This need may also be another driving force for some of the proposed capacity strategies. 
 If service firms are driven by the above two needs, it can then be further argued 
that these needs change a service firm’s perspective of capacity. In other words, the 
objective for a service firm is no longer to match demand and supply, but to maximize 
forward sales and reduce perceived risk. To that end, the strategies employed are aimed to 
achieve these objectives, instead of merely matching supply and demand. With this shift in 
focus, it is understandable why service firms would be more inclined to employ capacity 
strategies instead of the techniques generally suggested in the academic literature.  
 To summarize, this essay proposes that, except for the use of capacity for entry 
deterrence which is practiced also by goods firms, the three unique characteristics of services (i.e. 
perishability, inseparability and intangibility) push the firm towards the strategic objectives of 
maximizing forward sales  (i.e. by practicing advanced selling) and reducing risk of 
purchase.  With these strategic objectives, service firms would then employ the capacity 
strategies which would then lead to the strategic benefits of increase sales and improved 
profitability and which, in turn, lead to the outcome of improved business performance.  A 
skeletal model amalgamating the above arguments is illustrated in Figure 2.  It is hoped that 
this study would stimulate research to develop this model further. 
< Take in Figure 2 > 
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 Other Research Issues. The findings also suggested that operation policies and 
yield management practices often hinder the employment of capacity strategies. Many of 
the operations departments within the service firms interviewed treat capacity strategies as a 
necessary burden and a bane for depriving the company of more sales, as they tend to 
inhibit yield management practices. As such, marketing and sales teams constantly cross 
swords with operations and yield management teams in so far as capacity utilization is 
concerned, especially during peak seasons. The marketing and sales departments consider 
the practicing capacity strategies necessary, even during peak seasons, to ensure long-term 
revenue and to a large extent, assist in filling up capacity during the low seasons. The 
operations departments, however, are concerned with short-term yields and would 
constantly attempt to fill up capacity at high rates with little concern for the marketing 
implications. In several interviews, it was discovered that this conflict between short-term 
yield and long term revenue seems to be a constant battle within many service firms.  
 Such a conflict provides an avenue to investigate further the cost of unused 
capacity. Being able to cost unused capacity, whether in terms of actual cost or 
opportunities lost, can be a starting point towards evaluating potential pay-offs obtained 
from employing the various capacity strategies proposed. However, research acknowledges 
that the guidelines and policies towards accounting and measuring unused capacity are still 
vague (Brausch & Taylor, 1997; McNair, 1994). Without the ability to cost unused capacity, 
and thereby assessing capacity strategy pay offs, conflicts between short-term perspectives 
and long run increases in revenue will continually persist. It is hoped that future research 
shall also delve deeper into this area. 
 Besides the managerial implications from this presentation of capacity strategies, the 
theoretical aspects suggest a host of future research possibilities. Within each capacity 
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strategy, more empirical research is required, which would serve to develop a better 
understanding of its usage. 
 Finally, this essay does not address the issue of under capacity, i.e. when demand 
outstrips capacity. The predominant emphasis of this essay is the use of unused capacity as 
a strategic resource.  As such, should the happy problem of excessive demand and 
insufficient capacity be encountered, there is no unused capacity to speak of, and thus, no 
such resource is available. 
 A major contribution of this essay is the advancement of an alternative and pro-
active view of a service firm’s capacity as a strategic resource, through a theory-in-use 
methodology, manifested onto seven propositions. It is my belief that this contribution 
provides pedagogical benefits and substantial relevance to the practice of services 




 A service product is unique because of its intangibility, perishability, inseparability 
of production and consumption, and heterogeneity (cf. Berry & Parasuraman, 1991). These 
unique characteristics pose special challenges to service marketers, and therefore require 
them to be more creative in developing marketing strategies (Reddy, Buskirk and Kaicker, 
1993). With strategic planning and the development of competitive strategies playing a 
more important role in service companies (Wilson, 1988), a company's resources have to be 
managed so as to maximize its revenue according to the fluctuations in demand. 
 Service firms should view their capacity as an opportunity to formulate strategic 
plans and to exploit this opportunity to achieve maximum gains.As noted earlier, capacity 
management is often thought of as an operations management issue. Such delineation can 
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be counter-productive, as the development of a firm's core competence is in its ability to 
work across functional organizational boundaries (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). By working 
across functional boundaries, service companies can then boost efficiency and productivity 
and remain competitive. As an added emphasis and to aptly depict the essence of this essay, 
I conclude with the words of Ohmae (1982, p. 39):  
 "…Even when the company has in effect no more management resources than its competitors in the 
same business or trade, it can often achieve resounding competitive success, if it is effective in bringing these 
resources to bear on one crucial point." 
 Hence, the crucial point for competitive success in services hinges on efficient 
capacity utilization, and that the use of capacity, as the service firm's invisible but powerful 
resource, will bear on that point. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Companies interviewed by industry 
 
Industry No. of Companies Subtotal 
Professional    
Consulting Firms 6  
IT Firms (Software Programming) 2  
Law Firms 2  
Marine Services 2  
Advertising Agency 1  
Architectural Firm 1  
Engineering Firm 1 15 
Hospitality    
Cruise Lines 2  
Airline 1  
Hotel 1  
Hospital 1  
Restaurant 1  
Travel Agent 1 7 
Leisure    
Golf Club 1  
Health Club 1  
Movie Cable Network 1  
Stage Entertainment Firm 1 4 
Media & Telecommunications   
Media (News Service) 3  
Telecommunication 1 4 
Finance/Banking   
Retail Banks 2  
Finance Company 1  
Private Bank 1 4 
Education   
Higher Education Colleges 2 2 
Total Sample  36 
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Table 2: Capacity Utilization Strategies employed by the sample firms (Multiple Responses) 
 




% of Total  
Customer Development    
Companies that use capacity:    
To build loyalty 26 81%  
To provide trials 16 50%  
Subtotal 32 100% 89% 
Bundling    
Companies that bundle:    
To provide better service value  27 90%  
To increase demand 18 60%  
To reduce selling risk (insurance) 14 47%  
To reduce marketing costs 11 37%  
To obscure discounts 10 33%  
Subtotal 30 100% 83% 
Employee Endowment    
Companies that use capacity for 
employee endowment 
23 N.A 64% 
Exchanging    
Companies that exchange:    
To reduce cost 15 79%  
To extend product range 10 53%  
To improve yield  5 26%  
Subtotal 19 100% 53% 
Pledging    
Companies that use capacity for 
pledging 
14 N.A 39%  
Entry Deterrence    
Companies that use capacity for 
deterring entry 
9 N.A 25% 
Differentiation    
Companies that use capacity for 
differentiation 
4 N.A 13% 
TOTAL SAMPLE 36 N.A 100% 
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Figure 1: Capacity Utilization Strategies – Overview 
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Note: Proposition numbers developed in the essay are provided in parentheses
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C h a p t e r  2  
ADVANCED SALE OF SERVICE CAPACITIES: A THEORETICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF PRICE SENSITIVITY ON PRICING AND 
CAPACITY ALLOCATIONS 
ABSTRACT 
 Should service firms sell in advance?  Using a theoretical approach, I study the 
optimality of advanced sale of capacity for a monopolistic service firm and examine the 
impact of market price sensitivity on the optimal price and capacity allocations for 
advanced sale.  I show that, when firms undertake advanced sale, capacity utilization 
and profits are higher even though prices for sale in advance are discounted.  In 
addition, I show that optimal pricing and capacity allocations for advanced sale depend 
on the expected price sensitivity at the time of consumption.  When price sensitivity at 
the point of consumption is expected to be low (unchanged), it is optimal to allocate 
more (less) capacity for sale at time of consumption than in advance.  Although optimal 
price and capacity allocations in advanced sale result in excess capacity, I show that 
having excess capacity is a strategic decision in that it is dominant strategy. 
 




 In 1991, when there was a slump in the hotel industry, Marriott Corp. offered 
non-refundable discounted room rates for customers who were willing to purchase in 
advance.  This resulted in the firm selling in advance 250,000 non-refundable room 
nights, which was twice that expected (Weissenstein, 1991).  However, this practice did 
not catch on in the US, as the industry in general took a negative view of it. 
 More recently, with a drastic drop in tourism due to the economic crisis, the 
practice of advanced sale has resurfaced in Asia.  In November 1998, Siam City Hotel 
Bangkok held an auction to sell off blocks of room nights available for the rest of 1998.  
It succeeded in selling 1,400 room nights at an average price of 700 baht per room, 
which was much lower than standard quoted rates at that time (Hambi, 1998).  In a 
similar move, Sheraton Towers in Kuala Lumpur sold blocks of 1999 room nights in 
November 1998 to major corporations in Kuala Lumpur, at a much discounted rate.  
The practice of advance selling is not restricted to the hotel industry, it is also known to 
be done in industries like the airline and the car rental industries. 
 These industry cases of advanced sale raise several issues.  Given that not all in 
the industry have a positive view of the advanced sale of capacity at a discounted rate, it 
is uncertain if such a practice is in fact optimal.  Although studies have suggested that 
advance sales can be a profitable yield management practice (Nagle and Holden, 1995), 
little formal research has been performed to examine the optimality of advance sales.  
In addition, given that the occurrence of these practices coincides with an economic 
down turn, it raises a strong possibility that demand conditions affect the practice of 
advance sales.  However, it is not clear how demand conditions impact advanced sale, 
in terms of optimal pricing and capacity allocations. This essay therefore attempts to 
resolve some of these issues to gain some insights into the practice of advanced sale.  
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 It is acknowledged in the academic literature that the characteristics of services, 
in terms of their perishability and inseparability, require the management of demand 
and supply such that they match at any given point in time.  This is because unused 
service capacities cannot be inventoried, nor can they be readily altered in advance.  
One way that service firms can achieve such a demand-supply match, is to sell in 
advance their service capacities.  However, despite the practice of advanced sale of 
capacities by industry, theoretical research on advance selling is scant.  As such, issues 
about the optimality of advanced sale of service capacities, and optimal pricing and 
capacity allocation of advance sales, have not been formally investigated. 
 This essay examines the optimality of advanced sale of service capacities from 
an economic perspective.  A game theoretic model of advanced sale of service 
capacities is presented, for the case of a service firm commanding a monopolistic 
position.  This means that the firm has some degree of market power as a result of a its 
differentiation efforts, at least in the short term (Chamberlin, 1933).  Service firms 
achieve a monopolistic position through appropriate positioning and differentiation 
strategies to build brand equity, and implementing promotions strategy like customer 
loyalty programs, all of which increase customer switching costs (Reichheld, 1996).  
Hence, in practice, it is not unusual that service firms can command monopolistic 
positions even though they are not the only service providers in the market. 
 In this model, the firm determines the optimal prices and capacities for 
advanced sale, and for the day of consumption.  To examine how demand 
characteristics affect advanced sale of capacities, price sensitivity is incorporated in the 
model formulation, and the study investigates its impact on a firm's optimal pricing of, 
and capacity allocation for, advanced sale. 
 The study shows that, with advanced sale, capacity utilization and profits are 
higher than when advance sales is not undertaken.  However, profit maximization 
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necessitates that firms tolerate excess capacity.  This is because the profit maximizing 
price level need not be the same as that which maximizes sales of capacity.  In fact the 
study shows that having excess capacity is a dominant strategy in terms of profit 
maximization, across the varying price sensitivity conditions examined.  In addition, it 
shows that, when price sensitivity at the point of consumption is low, it is optimal to 
allocate more capacity at the time of consumption and less for advanced sale.  Doing so 
also results in better capacity utilization. 
 However, a counter intuitive result is that, although profits are greater, the 
optimal prices for advanced sale and at the time of consumption are lower, when price 
sensitivity at the point of consumption is low, than when price sensitivity is high.  It is 
also rather surprising that the optimal price discount for advanced sale is higher when 
price sensitivity at the time of consumption is low.  These suggest that firms should 
capitalize on the opportunity to increase capacity utilization when price sensitivity is 




What induces firms to sell their service in advance?  Several inferences can be 
made based on industry practices.  In the case of Eurotunnel (the operator of the 
Channel Tunnel), advance selling was done for cash flow reasons, to maximize cash 
revenues so as to ease the burden of paying interests on huge loans (Anon, 1994).  In 
the TV syndication industry, lower ratings that resulted from an oversupply of 
action/adventure cartoons prompted TV syndicates to advance sell in order to preempt 
competition, for an alternative softer animated series in 1987.  In the trade show 
industry, advanced sale is conducted to ease planning, and for efficiency reasons 
(Pridmore, 1987).  For the same reason, advanced sale (or “upfront” selling, as it is 
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termed in the industry) is also undertaken in the advertising industry.  For example, by 
advanced selling, the early monetary commitments by advertisers allows TV networks 
to plan their promotions budget based on committed revenues, to ensure that their 
shows achieve the promised ratings (Walley, 1990).  However, despite the practice in 
some industries to advance sell, the optimality of undertaking advanced sale is not 
equivocal among industry members. 
Current literature suggests that perishability may be a reason that service firms 
practice advanced sale of capacities.  Unused capacity after the point of 
consumption/production has no salvage value.  Thus, the perishable nature of services 
"drives service firms toward a greater urgency to maximize sales forward" (Ng, Wirtz 
and Lee, 1999). 
In addition, it has been suggested that price discrimination over time may be a 
driving force for advanced sale (Png, 1991).  This is plausible because, the uncertainty of 
service availability at the point of consumption may make a segment of consumers, who 
are more risk averse, to purchase in advance as an insurance against uncertainty (Png, 
1989).  Knowing this, firms can then maximize their profits by selling in advance, 
charging a price premium for advanced sale, and discounting their prices for remaining 
capacities as the consumption date approaches (Png, 1991).  However, this does not 
explain the practice of price discounting in advanced sale. 
With the exception of Png’s studies (1989, 1991), there is little theoretical 
research being conducted on the topic of advanced sale.  Like Png, this study examines 
the optimality of advanced sale of service capacities from an economic perspective.  
Similarly also, a theoretical approach was adopted to examine advanced sale of service 
capacities for the case of a service firm commanding a monopolistic position. 
Other than the similarities described, this model differs from that of Png’s in 
significant ways.  In this model, both pricing and capacity allocation are examined for 
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advanced sale.  To do this, the study structures this formulation based on a Cournot 
type response function, in which the firm chooses capacity allocations for sale in 
advance vis-à-vis at time of consumption.  In addition, price sensitivity is incorporated 
in this model, which allows us to examine its impact on the firm's decision on pricing 
and capacity allocations.  Finally, Png (1991) assumes demand outstrips capacity, hence 
the issue of excess capacity does not arise.  In contrast, this study does not place such a 
restriction on demand, as it is also interested in examining the impact of advanced sale 
on capacity utilization.  
The issue of advanced sale of capacities differs from that of price discrimination 
to influence demand such that a demand-supply match is achieved (e.g. the use of peak 
load pricing), which has been well discussed in the literature (Nagle & Holden, 1995).  
The latter involves pricing across different times of consumption, whereas advanced 
sale involves pricing for purchases made in advance of consumption at a particular time.  
For example, a hotel room on the Friday night of a long weekend is greatly sought after, 
compared to the same hotel room the day before.  This suggests a higher pricing for the 
room for Friday night, than other days.  However, in advanced sale, the study addresses 
the issue of how to price the same room for a particular day (Friday, for example), for 
consumers who wish to purchase well in advance of that day.  
The rest of the essay is organized as follows.  Model formulation is presented in 
§3.  In §4, the analyses are presented.  The study first considers the case when the firm 
does not practice advanced sale (§4a), to provide a benchmark for comparison later.  
This is followed by the case in §4b, in which the firm practices advanced sale of 
capacities.  Finally, in §4c, the impact of price sensitivity on pricing and capacity 
allocations is examined, when the firm practices advanced sale.  §5 discusses the results, 
and the final section contains some concluding remarks with regards to managerial 





Consider a service firm, for example a major hotel, which has achieved a 
monopolistic position as a result of its differentiation efforts, and has a total room 
capacity for any particular day of K.  Since capacity cannot be easily altered, it is 
assumed that the capacity K is a constant.  When deciding on advanced sale, the firm 
has to decide on the price and capacity to allocate for purchases made in advance.  Let t 
be the time to the consumption date, t0 (when t = 0) be the time of 
production/consumption, and tA (such that tA > t0 = 0) be the time of advanced sale.  At 
t0, the service is produced and consumed, and any unused capacity that arises has no 
salvage value after t0.  it is assumed that tA and t0 are exogenous. 
In practice, tA is industry specific.  For example, in the hotel and airline 
industries, firms are known to sell their capacities more than a year in advance in some 
markets (hence, tA is more than a year).  Whilst in the advertising industry, TV networks 
are known to sell their advertising spaces approximately 6 months in advance (tA 
representing 6 months in advance).  Hence, tA is defined as the time in advance of the 
date of service consumption that clients are prepared to make a purchase commitment.  
This also includes all forms of advanced bookings and reservations for a service, which 
is binding. 
As service firms in general operate with high fixed costs, C, which is much 
higher than the variable cost of capacity, the study considers the case when variable 
costs are sufficiently small to be ignored, for example airlines and hotel.  Let k0 and P0 
be the capacity and price of a unit capacity, respectively, at the time of consumption t0.  
Similarly, let kA and PA be the capacity and price of a unit capacity, respectively, at the 
time of advanced sale tA.  Hence, the firm’s objective function can be defined as, 
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Max.k π = Max.k [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] 
Where, π represents the firm’s profits.  The objective function implies that at a 
time before tA, the firm chooses price and capacity allocation for t0 and tA, to maximize 
profits.  Let the total sales revenue due to the firm be R, where R = Pk. I assume that 
the firm’s objective is to maximize profit although I acknowledge that capacity 
maximization may not purely be for profit maximization, but instead, be for other 
managerial focused objectives. 
It is assumed that price is a linear decreasing function of total capacity available 
at any point of time t. 
P = α - β(k), where k = total capacity at time t 
Hence, at time tA, the demand function becomes,  
PA = α - β(kA + k0)  (1) 
While at time t0, the demand function is, 
P0 = α - β(k0)   (2) 
The use of a linear demand function is consistent with prior marketing research.  
The use of linear demand functions is extensive in theoretical research (eg. Jeuland and 
Shugan, 1983; Ingene and Parry, 1995), and in empirical studies (Lilien, Kotler and 
Moorthy, 1992).  This is because a linear demand function can be a reasonable 
approximation of a non-linear one, given that the latter can be defined as one that 
comprises a series of linear functions (f(x) = ∑i fi(x): xj ≤ x ≤ xk, i = 1 to n, j ≠ k) over an 
appropriately partitioned (xj ≤ x ≤ xk) non-linear one such that the range of each 
partition approaches zero (ie. (xk - xj) → 0).  The accuracy of a linear function as an 
approximation of a non-linear one thus depends on how the non-linear function is 
partitioned and the range of interest. Furthermore, our demand functions assume that 
the price at spot isn’t affected by advanced prices. In practice, this is seen with airlines 
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and hotels where advanced tickets can only be purchased with several conditions 
(termed as ‘fare rules’), and at a specific time. While this assumption is not 
unreasonable, I acknowledge that is a limitation of the model and relax this assumption 
in following chapter. 
 
ANALYSES 
The study first analyse when the firm does not practice advanced sale, before 
considering the case when the firm practices advanced sale.  All proofs to the 
propositions are found in the appendix. 
 
(a) Profitability without Advanced Sale 
 Without advance sales, the firm's objective function becomes, 
Max.k π = Max.k (P0k0 – C) 
 Substituting equation (2) for the price function, into the firm’s objective 
function, and deriving the first order condition with respect to k0, the optimal capacity 
allocation can be solved.  The solution being,  
k0 = k* = α/2β 
However, this assumes that an interior solution exist, that is k0 = k* ≤ K.  In which case, 
given that k*= k0 = α/2β, the optimal price and resulting profits would be,  
P0 = P* = α - β(k*) = α/2 
π = (P0k0 – C)  =  [(α2/4β) – C] 
This also results in the firm having an excess capacity,  
e = (K – k*) = (K - α/2β) > 0 
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However, if k0 = k* > K, then k* = K, resulting in an excess capacity e = 0.  Under this 
situation, the optimal price and the resulting profits would be, P* = [α - β(K)] and π*  = 
[(α - βK)K – C], respectively. 
 
Proposition 1: Having excess capacity intentionally is profit maximizing if K > α/2β. 
 
 The proposition is rather counter intuitive, as a common call in the service 
literature on capacity management calls for matching demand and supply, thus implying 
that excess capacity is unhealthy profit wise (Orsini and Karagozoglu, 1988; Sasser, 
1976; Shemwell & Cronin, 1994).  However, the proposition is intuitively plausible, as a 
low price level that maximises the sales of capacity causes a firm to lose out in profit 
margins.  The loss in profit margins can be sufficiently large, to the extent that a low 
price that maximises capacity utilisation may not be profit maximising.  Furthermore, if 
the variable cost of capacity is sufficiently low, then excess capacity does not pose as a 
substantial cost burden. 
 For the rest of this essay, the study focuses only on the case when an interior 
solution exists – that is k* ≤ K.  Otherwise, the results will be driven strictly by 
boundary conditions, and maximum achievable profits are not attained. 
 
(b) Profitability with Advanced Sale 
If the firm chooses to sell in advance, its objective function is, 
π = [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] 
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into the above, and deriving the first order condition 
with respect to kA and k0, the optimal capacity allocations is derived after solving the 
first order conditions simultaneously. 
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k0  = k*  = α/3β 
kA  = k**  = α/3β 
e = (K - k* - k**) = (K - α/3β - α/3β) = (K - 2α/3β) 
 Substituting k* and k** into equations (1) and (2), and rearranging, the optimal 
price levels can be derived, which are as follows. 
P0 = P* = 2α/3 
PA = P**= α/3 
 
Proposition 2a:  Capacity utilisation is higher when advanced sale of capacity is undertaken, than 
when it is not, i.e. e(advanced sale) < e(no advanced sale). 
 
Proposition 2b:  Advanced sale of capacity at a reduced price of PA = α/3 supports an even higher 
price at time of consumption of P0 = 2PA = 2α/3, than when no advanced sale is 
undertaken (P0 = α/2).  
 
 When no advanced sale is undertaken, then a larger amount of capacity 
available at the point of consumption (k0 = k* = α/2β) drives prices down.  However, 
with advanced sale, half the capacity is sold in advance (albeit at a lower price), resulting 
in less capacity being available at the time of consumption (k0 = k* = α/3β = kA = k**).  
Hence, prices are driven up at the time of consumption.  The overall effect is that 
capacity utilisation is improved, and profits are increased, as Proposition 3 below 
shows. 
 This perhaps provides an explanation for the practice of advance selling of TV 
advertising slots in the USA, as reported earlier.  TV networks typically sell 75%-80% of 
their season’s advertisement capacity months before the advertisements are aired.  The 
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remaining capacity is held back for quarterly “scatter” markets, where prices are much 
higher because there is less capacity available to meet demand (Mandese, 1995). 
Substituting the above prices in the firm’s profit function, the following is obtained 
after some algebraic rearrangement, 
π = (α2/3β) – C 
 
Proposition 3a:  A symmetric allocation of capacity across t0 and tA, k* = k** = (α/3β), is 
optimal. 
 
Proposition 3b:  Advanced sale of capacity, even at a price discount, is more profitable than when no 
advance sale is undertaken: π((P0, k0), (PA, kA)) > π(P0, k0). 
 
 Allocating half of a firm's capacity for sale in advance is optimal in terms of 
profit maximisation, and is more profitable than selling all the capacity at the time of 
consumption.  The result, that having advanced sales is more profitable than having no 
advance sales, is consistent with that obtained by Png (1991).  However, Png’s study 
does not address the issue of capacity allocation for advanced sale.  In addition, in Png’s 
analysis, advanced sale is carried out at a price premium.  In contrast, a price discount is 
optimal, in this analysis. 
 Proposition 3 is consistent with the current industry practice of advanced sale 
of airline tickets in Asia.  Customers purchasing airline tickets in advance will find ready 
availability of seats, and at a significantly reduced special fare - commonly termed 
APEX (Advance Purchase Excursion) fares.  However, passengers who purchase their 
tickets close to the departure date, will find to their dismay that seats are not readily 
available, even if they are prepared to pay a price premium.  
 
61 
(c) Low Price Sensitivity Forecasted at t0 
 Given that economic conditions can change over time, it will affect price 
sensitivity accordingly.  Hence, in this section, the study investigates how a low (or a 
high) price sensitivity forecast can affect advanced sale.  When consumers have low 
price sensitivity at t0, then they are less sensitive to price variations in making their 
purchases at t0.  Hence, an additional unit of capacity allocated at t0 results in a smaller 
decrease in price at t0.  To incorporate changes in price sensitivity over time into this 
formulation, let the price sensitivity at t0 and tA be β0 and βA, respectively, such that,   
β0 ∈ {βL, βH} and 
βL < βA < βH 
 The symbol βL represents a price sensitivity that is low, while the symbol βH 
represents a price sensitivity that is high, at t0.  Incorporating the differing price 
sensitivities into the firm’s objective function, the following is obtained,  
= (α - βA(kA + k0))kA + (α - βL(k0))k0 - C 
By deriving the first order condition with respect to kA and k0, and solving the resulting 
equations simultaneously, the optimal capacity allocations are derived, which are,   
k0  = k*  = α/(4βL - βA) 
kA  = k**  = [α(2βL - βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA] 
 
Proposition 4a:  When price sensitivity at t0 is expected to be low, more capacity is allocated for sale 
at time of consumption t0, and less capacity is allocated for advanced sale at tA, 
resulting in k*/k** > 1. 
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Proposition 4b:  When price sensitivity at t0 is expected to be low (β0 = βL  < βA), capacity 
utilisation is greater than that when (β0 = β  = βA), resulting in lower excess 
capacity, if βA > βL > (βA/4). 
 
 A decrease in price sensitivity as the consumption date approaches can be due 
to imminent perishability of the service.  The fact that a service is perishable is double-
edged.  Neither a firm nor a customer can store capacity.  Hence, when consumers are 
uncertain about the value they place on the service till close to the time of consumption 
(Png, 1989), they may find themselves with less time to make purchases and less choices 
as well.  These translate into a lowering of price sensitivity being observed in the 
market, as the date of consumption approaches. 
 In addition, a consumer who has not made any advanced booking for a hotel is 
likely to be less price sensitive when he/she requires a room at the time of 
consumption, than one who has made an advanced booking well ahead of the time of 
consumption.  With regards to the hotel industry, it is a known fact that business 
travellers, who usually make their hotel bookings close to the time of consumption, are 
far less price sensitive than tourists, who usually make their hotel bookings far in 
advance. 
 Given that price sensitivity is lower at the time of consumption, a firm can 
therefore capitalize on this by allocating a higher capacity at t0, and less at tA.  Doing so 
will also increase capacity utilization, resulting in lower excess capacity. 
Substituting k* and k** into the price and the firm’s profit functions, the following is 
obtained, 
P0  = P*  = α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA) 
PA  = P** = α(2βL - βA)]/(4βL - βA) 
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= {[α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA)][α/(4βL - βA)]} + {[α(2βL - βA)]/(4βL - βA)][α(2βL - 
βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA]} – C 
⇒ π = [α2βL/((4βL - βA)βA)] – C 
 
Proposition 5a:  The price levels (PA, P0), when price sensitivity at t0 is low (β0 = βL  < βA), are 
lower than that when (β0 = β  = βA). 
Proposition 5b:  When price sensitivity at t0 is low (β0 = βL  < βA), the price reduction (PA/P0) 
for advanced sale is greater than that when (β0 = β  = βA). 
Proposition 5c:  When price sensitivity at t0 is low (β0 = βL  < βA), profitability is greater than 
that when (β0 = β  = βA), if βA > βL > (βA/4). 
 
 A rather surprising result is that the optimal price levels for advance sales and at 
the time of consumption are reduced (Proposition 5a), when the market is forecasted to 
be less price sensitive at the time of consumption.  It is also counter intuitive that the 
optimal price discount for advanced sale is increased (Proposition 5b).  However, the 
resulting profits are greater than that when the price sensitivity is forecasted to be 
unchanged (Proposition 5c).  These results, together with Proposition 4, suggest that 
the firm should take advantage of the lower price sensitivity at the time of consumption 
to increase capacity utilization, even if price levels are lowered and more discounts are 
given for advanced sale. 
 For the case when the price sensitivity is forecasted to be higher at the time of 
consumption, the results are a reversal of that when the price sensitivity is forecasted to 
be lower (Appendix). 
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DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 This study shows that advance selling of service capacities is optimal.  It is 
commonly believed that advanced selling stems from demand uncertainty at time of 
consumption, or is motivated by competitive preemption.  The findings show that even 
when these factors are absent, advance selling is optimal. 
Across all the cases analyzed, profit maximizing prices result in non-zero excess 
capacity.  This suggests that it is optimal to plan for excess capacity.  In fact, from 
Propositions 1, 2a, 3b, 4a, and 5c, it can be generalized that having excess capacity is a 
dominant strategy.  The corollary thus follows. 
Corollary 1:  It is a dominant strategy to plan for, or to have, excess capacity, if the firm’s total 
capacity is higher than the optimal capacity sold. 
 
 The corollary implies that, in the initially planning of capacity, a firm should 
intentionally plan for excess capacity.  This is to ensure that it does not miss out on the 
opportunity cost of lost sales, so that profits can be maximized.  Furthermore, given 
that fixed costs of operations way out weigh the variable cost of operations, service 
firms should focus on optimal pricing that maximizes profits, rather that that maximizes 
capacity utilization. 
 However, the notion of holding excess capacity appears to go against the grain 
of conventional wisdom held by the industry.  The common argument being that, 
selling the excess capacity even at a much lower price earns something at least, which is 
better than earning nothing if excess capacity is held.  This argument is valid only if 
service firms can successfully price discriminate across consumers at the time of 
consumption.  Otherwise, the lower price for excess capacity drags down the profit 
maximizing higher price.  Thus, to achieve price discrimination of consumers at the 
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time of consumption, a “waiting list” of consumers can be created to fill the excess 
capacity at the very last moment. 
Corollary 2:  Service firms can price discriminate to maximize sales of excess capacity by creating a 
“waiting list” of consumers. 
 
 Other plausible ways of achieving successful price discrimination at the time of 
consumption are suggested by Ng et al. (1999). 
 It has been acknowledged that allocating fixed costs is a problem in service 
operations.  Some firms distribute fixed costs over its entire capacity, to account for 
unit capacity costs, in performing break-even analysis (Lovelock, 1991).  Doing so may 
lead to a sub-optimal price being charged, which is not profit maximizing, as there is the 
danger that the unit price is being treated as substitute of unit variable cost in 
determining profit maximizing prices.  Furthermore, by allocating fixed costs over the 
entire service capacity, firms may become reluctant to price low in advance.  Yet, if 
prices are not low in advance, a higher price at time of consumption cannot be 
supported.  Thus, service firms that operate on high fixed cost and low variable cost 
should be cautious about the allocation of fixed cost across capacity in their yield 
management practices. 
 The results show that capacity allocation for advance sales is dependent on 
price sensitivity.  Specifically, when price sensitivity is forecasted to be low (high), the 
capacity allocated for advanced sale decreases.  Hence, from Propositions 3a and 4a, the 
corollary follows, which provides a guideline for capacity planning. 
 
Corollary 3:  Service firms should increase (decrease) the capacity allocation for advanced sale if 
the forecast of the price sensitivity at the time of consumption is high (low).  
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 Finally, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that when price sensitivity at the time of 
consumption is expected to be low, then service firms should increase their capacity at 
the time of consumption and (even) lower their prices to capitalize on the low price 
sensitivity.  The corollary thus follows. 
Corollary 4:  Service firms should increase the capacity allocation and also lower their prices at 
the time of consumption if the forecast of the price sensitivity at that time is low. 
 
 Hence, although this work is theoretical in nature, there are several important 
decision rules that can be deduced (Corollaries 1 to 4) to guide managers in their 




 There are several directions for future research.  This study formulated this 
model based on supply-side economics in using the Cournot type demand function.  
This is done in order to investigate the impact of price sensitivity on advanced sale.  A 
future research direction is to structure the model based on a Bertrand type demand 
function.  Doing so would allow the examination of the impact of demand elasticity on 
optimal pricing and capacity allocation in advanced sale.  The results from the two 
perspectives can then be compared to gain greater insights in the practice of advanced 
sale.   Competition has been excluded from this analysis. Work is in progress on an 
extended model to include competition, with the aim of investigating how competitive 
interactions will impact advanced sale.  It is for this reason also that, method wise, a 
game theory based approach has been adopted, to examine the practice of advanced 
sale in this essay.  It is hoped that this essay will provide greater stimulus to researchers 
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in service marketing to perform theoretical research based on deductive science, hence 




Anonymous, Chunnel Ticket Sales off to a Slow Start. ENR (Jan 241994): 19 
 
Hambi, Raini, Siam City in Latest Discounting Tactic. TravelAsia (Nov 13-19 1998): 3 
 
Ingene, Charles A., and Parry, Mark E., Channel Coordination When Retailers 
Compete. Marketing Science 14 (4), (1995): 360-377 
 
Jeuland, Abel P., and Shugan, Steven M., Managing Channel Profits. Marketing Science 
2 (Summer 1983): 239-272 
 
Lilien, Gary L., Kotler, Philip., and Moorthy, Sridhar, Marketing Models, Prentice-Hall,  
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1992 
 
Lovelock, Christopher, Services Marketing, Prentice-Hall,  Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1991 
 
Mandese, Joe, The Buying and Selling. Advertising Age (Spring 1995): 20 
 
Nagle, Thomas T., and Holden, Reed K., The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1995 
 
Ng, Irene C.L, Wirtz, Jochen, and Lee, Khai-Sheang, The Strategic Role of Unused 
Service Capacity. International Journal of Service Industry Management 10 (1999) 
(forthcoming). 
 
Orsini, J., and Karabozoglu, N., Marketing/Production Interfaces in Service 
Industries.  Advance Management Journal 53 (3) (1988): 34-38. 
 
Pridmore, Jay, Another Niche, Another Show. Venture (Jan 1987): 38-44 
 
Reichheld, Frederick F., The Loyalty Effect: The Hidden Force Behind Growth, Profits and 
Lasting Value, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1996 
 
Sasser, W. Earl, Match Supply and Demand in Service Industries. Harvard Business 
Review 54 (Nov-Dec 1976): 133-140. 
 
Shemwell, Donald J. Jr, and Cronin, Joseph J. Jr, Service Marketing Strategies for 
Coping with Demand/Supply Imbalances. Journal of Services Marketing 8(4) 
(1994): 14-24. 
 
Png, Ivan P.L., Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over 
Time. Journal of Political Economy 99(5) (1991): 1010-1028. 
 
------, Reservations: Customer Insurance in the Marketing of Capacity. Marketing 
Science, 8(3) (Summer 1989): 248-264 
 
Walley, Wayne, Upfront TV Season: Ante Up for the Big Poker Game. Advertising Age 
(May 28 1990): 33, 42 
Weissenstein, Eric, Foes Slam Door on Marriott Plan. Advertising Age (Nov 4 1991): 
69 
APPENDIX (PROOFS) 
Proof of Proposition 1: π = (P0k0 – C) = [(α - βk0)k0 – C] ⇒ FOC (wrt k0): 0 = α - 
2βk0 ⇒ k0 = k* = α/2β, if k0 = k* < K.  Hence, P0  = P* = α - β(k*) = α/2, e = (K – 
k*) = (K - α/2β) > 0, and π = (P0k0 – C)  =  [(α2/4β) – C].  If k0 = k* ≥ K, then k* = 
K ⇒ P* = α - β(K), e = 0, and π = (P0k0 – C) =  [(α - βK)K – C]. ⇒ Profit 
maximizing price results in excess capacity e > 0.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2a: π(without advance) = (P0k0 – C) = [(α - βk0)k0 – C] ⇒ FOC 
(wrt k0): 0 = α - 2βk0 ⇒ k0 = k*  = α/2β, P0  = P* = α - β(k*) = α/2, and e(without 
advance) = (K – k*) = (K - α/2β).  Hence, π(without advance) = (P0k0 – C) =  
[(α2/4β) – C].  On the other hand, π(with advance) = [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] ⇒ π (with 
advance) = (α - β(kA + k0))kA + (α - β(k0))k0 – C ⇒ FOC wrt kA: 0 = α - 2βkA - βk0.  
FOC wrt k0: 0 = α - 2βk0 - βkA.  Solve simultaneously the two FOCs: k0 = k* = α/3β 
and kA = k** = α/3β ⇒ e(with advance) = (K - k* - k**) = (K - α/3β - α/3β) = (K - 
2α/3β).  Hence, ewith advance = (K - 2α/3β) < ewithout advance = (K - α/2β).  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2b:  
Substituting k* and k** into equations (1) and (2), and rearranging, I can derive the 
optimal price levels, P0(with advance) = P* = 2α/3, and PA = P**= α/3.  Therefore 
when advanced sale is not undertaken, P0(without advance) = α/2 < P0(with advance) 
= 2α/3.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3a: k* = k** = (α/3β) derived from first order condition of 
profit π w.r.t. capacity. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3b:  
Since π(with advance) = [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C], PA=α/3, kA=α/3β, P0=2α/3 and 
k0=α/3β, ⇒ π = (α/3)(α/3β) + (2α/3)(α/3β) – C = (α2/3β) – C.  Hence, 
π(without advance) = [(α2/4β) – C] < π(with advance) = (α2/3β) – C.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4a: When β0 = βL  < βA, k* = [α/(4βL - βA)], and k** = [α(2βL - 
βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA]. When β0 = β  = βA, k* = α/(3βA) = k**.  Hence, more capacity is 
allocated for sale at t0, as [α/(4βL - βA)] > α/(3βA), if (4βL - βA) < (3βA) ⇒ βL < βA, 
which is true.  Less capacity is allocated for sale at tA, as [α(2βL - βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA] < 
α/(3βA), if 6βL - 3βA) < (4βL - βA) ⇒ βL < βA, which is true.  Hence, k*/k** = [α/(4βL 
- βA)] x [(4βL - βA)βA]/ [α(2βL - βA)] = βA/ (2βL - βA) > 1 if βA > (2βL - βA) ⇒ βA > 
βL.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4b: When β0 = β  = βA, e = [K - 2α/3βA].  When β0 = βL  < βA, 
e = [K - α/(4βL - βA) - α(2βL - βA)/(βA(4βL - βA))].  Hence, capacity utilization is 
greater when the price sensitivity at t0 is low as, [K - 2α/3βA] - [K - α/(4βL - βA) - 
α(2βL - βA)/(βA(4βL - βA))] > 0 ⇒ βA > βL > (βA/4) (after rearranging the inequality). 
QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5a: When β0 = β  = βA, P0 = 2PA = 2α/3.  When β0 = βL  < βA, 
P0 = α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA), and PA = α(2βL - βA)]/(4βL - βA).  Hence, the price level 
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at t0 is lower when price sensitivity at t0 is low as, α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA) < 2α/3, if 
(9βL - 3βA) < (8βL - 2βA) ⇒ true for βA > βL.  The price level at tA is also lower when 
price sensitivity at t0 is low as, α(2βL - βA)/(4βL - βA) < α/3, if (6βL - 3βA) < (4βL - βA) 
⇒ true for βA > βL. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5b: When β0 = β  = βA, P0 = 2PA = 2α/3, resulting in PA/P0 = 
½ (or 50% of P0).  When β0 = βL  < βA, PA/P0 = (2βL - βA)/(3βL - βA) < ½ if 2(2βL - 
βA) < (3βL - βA) ⇒ (4βL - 2βA) < (3βL - βA) ⇒ βL < βA, which is true.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5c: When β0 = β  = βA, π = [(α2/3β) – C].  When β0 = βL  < βA, 
π = [[α2βL/((4βL - βA)βA)] – C].  Hence, {[[α2βL/((4βL - βA)βA)] – C] - [(α2/3β) – C]} 
> 0 ⇒ {(βA - βL)(4βL - βA)} > 0 (after rearranging the inequality), which implies that 
βA > βL > (βA/4). QED. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
THE PRICING OF SERVICES: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper aims to provide a deeper conceptual understanding of demand 
behavior and the pricing of services.  It argues why all services are sold in advance and 
show how the specificities of services result in two types of risks faced by buyers who 
buy in advance, that of unavailability of service and a low valuation of the service at the 
time of consumption. Furthermore, advanced buyers run the risk of not being able to 
consume at the time of consumption and this relinquished capacity may be re-sold by 
service firms. The paper develops a theoretical model that show that advance prices are 
always lower than spot prices. Also, providing a refund to advanced buyers may be 
optimal. In addition, the paper show a counter intuitive result that under certain 
conditions, the firm’s strategy may be pareto optimal in that a guarantee against capacity 
unavailability and a refund guarantee against valuation risk may be offered to advance 
buyers at a lower advance price than if a refund offer is not provided. Finally, our study 
also showed that the firm could earn higher revenue when the risks are asymmetric. 
Profits are higher when the market faces high valuation risks than when the market 
faces unavailability risk.  
 





 Services now account for a large percentage of the gross national output of 
many developed countries. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), informs us that the service sector4 comprises some of the 
world’s largest corporations, and these corporations are major buyers and users of 
advanced technology, are the most active innovators, are facilitating a major re-
engineering of a growing number of firms across all sectors of the economy, are a major 
stimulant to productivity and efficiency (through outsourcing services), and, through e-
commerce, are having a catalytic effect by transforming and accelerating changes that 
are already underway in the economy. 
 Yet, in a world where a cinema ticket can be obtained for 20p5, flight tickets at 
£16, and songs at 50p7, even the most discerning marketer might wonder if the pricing 
for services have gone mad, or if not, perhaps a little out of control. To top it all, there 
are now multiple prices for buying any service, depending on where you are, why, when 
and how you are buying. With new technologies, the capability of firms to offer even 
more innovative pricing options is set to grow (Xie and Shugan, 2001) 
 In throwing light on the nature and issues surrounding pricing for services, the 
industry itself is not helping. Within the service economy lie a heterogeneous set of 
activities such as financial services, telecommunication, retail, restaurants, 
transportation, entertainment, education, public services, not to mention not-for-profit 
activities. Hence, many who attempt to study it have lamented on its diversity. Adding 
to the complexity of pricing is the fact that many services are bundled with goods, or 
may be a facilitating service between two or more services and/or goods e.g. a mobile 
                                                 
4  “The Service Economy, Final Report of the Business and Industry Policy Forum on Realising the Potential of the 
Service Economy”, OECD Business and Industry Policy Forum. 2000 
5  Working Lunch, BBC News, May 23, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/working_lunch/2932232.stm 
6 “Trip the Flight fantastic,” customer review and opinion on ryanair.com written on 10.10 2001, 
http://www.ciao.co.uk/ryanair_com__Review_5149396 
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payment service. Yet, price complexity may be useful to service firms, as the 
customization (versus commoditization) of a service arising from a more direct contact 
with consumers may result in the consumer being less able to compare prices and 
consequently, more market power for the firm.  
 How does one, then, begin to study pricing for services? Is there a common 
thread across all services? Does the pricing of telecommunications services have 
anything in common with an airline ticket? What can we learn from pricing one service 
that we can apply into the pricing of another? 
 This paper aims to provide a deeper conceptual understanding of demand 
behavior and the pricing of services, specifically services with high fixed costs, low 
variable costs and short-term capacity constraints such as hotels, airlines, and 
restaurants.  It begins with a critique of conventional pricing approaches, leading 
into a conceptual development of pricing in services and argues for four stylized facts. 
These stylized facts show how the specificities of services result in two types of risks 
faced by service buyers; that of unavailability of service and a low valuation of the 
service at the time of consumption. The risk of unavailability of service would drive 
buyers to buy in advance (to ensure availability) while the risk of valuation would drive 
buyers to buy at the time of consumption (to be sure that they want to consume it at 
that time (i.e. value the service). For example, tourists buying flight tickets may buy in 
advance so that they are assured of a seat while business customers may prefer to buy at 
the time of consumption when they are more assured of the date they are required to 
travel.  
 The stylized facts also introduce the probability of advanced buyers not being 
able to consume the service at consumption time and how the capacity relinquished can 
                                                                                                                                       
7  Online music clubs e.g. MSN Music club 
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be re-sold. Against this backdrop, a theoretical model of pricing for services is 
developed.  
 In the theoretical model, the results show that advanced prices are always lower 
than spot (consumption time) prices because of higher potential revenue contributed by 
advanced purchase as a result of the probability of non-consumption. This paper also 
shows that providing a refund to advanced buyers may be more profitable. This is 
because the firm is able to obtain higher revenue from higher prices and increased 
advanced demand from the refund offer. In addition, the study uncovered that when 
advanced demand is highly price sensitive the firm’s strategy may be pareto optimal in 
that a capacity guarantee and refund offer is offered to advance buyers at a lower 
advance price than if a refund offer is not provided. This is because the expanded 
demand from the refund offer is high enough to provide higher revenue (both actual 
and potential) to the firm even when advanced prices are lower. Finally, the study also 
showed that the firm could earn higher revenue when the risks are asymmetric. In other 
words if the market consists of buyers who face high valuation risks (i.e. are concerned 
that they would not value the service at the time of consumption), profit is higher than 
when the market consists of buyers who face unavailability risk (i.e. concerned about 
unavailability of capacity). This is because when the market faces a high valuation risk, 
spot prices become higher, thereby contributing to higher revenue earned from re-sold 
capacity of non-consuming advanced buyers. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §1, a background of the study is 
presented with a critique of conventional pricing approaches. This is followed by §2, the 
development of a conceptual model of pricing services, putting forward four 
propositions. Following on, in §3, a theoretical model formulation is presented. The 
model is then extended to incorporate a refund offer in §4. In §5, asymmetric demand 
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functions are considered.   Discussion of the results follows in §6 and the paper 
oncludes with some remarks and directions for future research. 
 
BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
 One of the most popular, and yet acknowledged as the most ineffective way to 
price a product, be it a goods or a service, is the use of ‘cost-plus’ pricing. Essentially, 
this type of pricing sets a price for the product that is sufficient to recover the full costs 
i.e. variable and fixed costs, and add a sufficient margin above that cost to provide the 
firm with some profit. Perpetuated by companies who are accounting or operations 
centered, this approach seems to be financially sound and logical.  
 However, such an approach would pose problems, especially in high fixed cost 
services. For services like transportation, airlines or 3G telecommunication services, 
how would one begin to price such that the fixed costs can be sufficiently covered? In 
transportation and airlines, fixed costs could include the cost of assets such as a cargo 
ship, or an airplane, whilst for 3G, the fixed cost could be the cost of acquiring the 3G 
license. Aside from the obviously high costs of these assets, the service may reap the 
benefit of the asset for the next 20, 50 years or some uncertain number of years. The 
cost-based price set for each unit of the service is therefore some amount that is a 
contribution towards the overall fixed (and sunk) costs. This contribution is not only 
difficult to determine, it is also inconsistently practiced across firms. Hence, when 
marginal costs are zero, the ‘cost’ computed in the cost-based approach is some amount 
contributing towards fixed costs and the price is some percentage above that amount, 
given the volume to be sold. Such a pricing approach may lead to uncertain outcomes 
when firms begin to compete on price. For example, if a service is less differentiated 
from its competitor and a price competition results, how low can a service firm price 
vis-à-vis the other, when each firm apportion its costs differently, and may be changed 
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at a whim? This could explain the downward spiraling prices experienced by the airline 
industry in the 1980s, after de-regulation (see Levine, 1987 for an analysis of airline 
competition then). More recently, this problem has again surfaced when aggressive 
pricing by European low cost airlines has resulted in losses for some, prompting the 
Chief Executive of Easyjet to comment that pricing by budget and full service airlines 
are “unprofitable and unrealistic” 8 
 Furthermore, firms who adopt this approach show a lack of understanding of 
how pricing theory functions. The simplest criticism (e.g. Nagle, 1995) is that costs per 
unit cannot be determined without knowing the volume to be produced and the 
volume to produce is dependent on demand that is in turn determined by the price. By 
setting a ‘cost-plus’ price, the ‘cost’ is at best an approximation. 
 Yet, one may still be tempted to argue in its favor by pointing out that since the 
future is uncertain, the circularity for pricing can never be squared unless some forecast 
is made of the uncertain demand. Hence, it is not far fetched if the firm is to forecast 
the demand characteristics, based on historical data, and price its product based on the 
‘cost’ of producing that forecasted volume. 
 A whole stream of research on demand forecasting and yield/revenue 
management in high fixed cost services such as airlines and hotels have emerged 
following this point. In the majority of these studies, the yield management problem is 
structured as one in which firms maximize payoffs/yield, given some forecasted 
demand profile (e.g. Badinelli and Olsen 1990; Belobaba 1989; Bodily and Weatherford 
1995; Hersh and Ladany 1978; Pfeifer 1989; Toh 1979). Over time, increasingly 
complex demand profiles, which require increasingly sophisticated mathematical 
algorithms to obtain solutions, have been introduced and investigated (e.g. Alstrup et. 
                                                 
8 BBC News, 5 May 2004 
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al. 1986; Hersh and Ladany 1978). Most of these studies deal with how much capacity 
should be allotted for a given set of prices. 
 The problem with this approach is three-fold. First, to use an exogenous 
demand profile where the profile is divorced from both the capacity allocation and 
pricing decision of the firm is not only unrealistic, it is also wrong. When a firm changes 
the capacity allocated to a particular price level, the firm should optimally revise that 
price and demand, in turn, would be expected to adjust. If price levels and demand 
profile are exogenous, any optimal solution would be a false optimal.   
 Second, without a theoretical structure to explain why demand quantities are the 
way they are or why they follow a particular pattern across time, there is no assurance 
that the past is able to predict the future. Pricing needs to be rooted on primitive 
consumer behavior. Why consumers behave they way they do is just as important as to 
how they are behaving. Accordingly, despite tremendous computing power available 
today, pricing based on forecasted demand face the same old problem in conventional 
probability theory, where according to Bernstein (1996), “the raw material of the model 
is the data of the past”.  
 Third, demand profiles are subject to a great many factors, not least the actions 
and strategies of the competitor. To assume that demand based on historical data can 
still hold for some future may be assuming too much. Consequently, since revenue 
management fundamentally brings in the pricing behavior of firms, concepts of 
consumer behavior (demand behavior) should be incorporated. Thus, revenue 
management is not merely an operational or optimization issue.  
 Given that accounting and the operations management disciplines may not 
provide a satisfying approach to pricing in services, do the economists have a better 
handle on this then? As evidenced by the Bank of England’s quarterly report (1998), 
clearly not: 
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 “…some of the new service industries may have special economic properties that do not fit 
well with the assumptions of conventional economic models. For example, telephony and computer 
software production have high initial costs but very low marginal costs. As a result, pricing strategies 
may be more complex, and component services are sometimes embedded in customized packages that 
can obscure the price actually paid or the services actually bought.” 
 What this means is that when marginal costs are negligible, as in the case of 
high fixed cost services such as telecommunication, hotels, or airlines, the cost function 
is a straight line i.e. it doesn’t matter how much the demand is, the cost is always 
negligible since all the costs to produce the service had been sunk.  
 Furthermore, since the service is perished immediately upon production, the 
optimal pricing strategy for the firm is to sell at the point on the demand curve where 
marginal revenue is zero, that is, if the maximum capacity of the service has not been 
reached.  Inasmuch as conventional price theory goes, that is the advice.  
 Clearly, the disciplines of accounting, decision sciences and economics take a 
very different view of costs in services. Whilst the economists contend that sunk costs 
are sunk and should not feature in pricing decisions, accounting and decision science 
disciplines insist that pricing decisions have to take into account the return of the fixed 
costs. To a limited extent, both are correct. To borrow terminology from economics, ex 
ante, pricing decisions should not take into account costs that had been sunk. However, 
ex-post, prices obtained may be used to calculate the returns to asset investment. The 
confusion arises when ex-post analyses attempts to influence ex-ante pricing decisions. 
 Yet, despite ex-ante decision on pricing that do not consider sunk costs, this 
paper argues that the research in service pricing have over-simplified the service firm’s 
pricing decision. The complex pricing programs available in various service industries 
today clearly illustrates that more needs to be explored. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRICING IN 
SERVICES 
 Academic service literature informs us that services are unique in that they are 
perishable, intangible, inseparable between production and consumption, and 
heterogeneous in delivery, all at once. Furthermore, other distinctively service traits 
(although not necessarily unique) include high fixed to variable costs ratio and largely 
temporal in nature. What the literature isn’t too clear about is how such specificities 
affect pricing. Mere descriptions of service characteristics would not be useful, 
therefore, unless translated into some meaningful insights that assist firms in the pricing 
decision. 
 Let us take, as an example of a service, pricing a room in a 300-room hotel on 
New Year’s Eve. The room could be sold 6 months or probably even a year in advance. 
The mere fact that it can be sold in advance shows that there must be something about 
the service that causes willingness in a customer to buy before the day itself, factors that 
I will discuss later. For now, let us think about the value the customer attaches to the 
room in advance, and that the firm wishes to capture that value in the asking price of 
the room. This value would not only differ across different customers but even for just 
one customer, it would differ according to when he wishes to purchase it. If it is too far 
in advance, he might not even be willing to buy.  
 Let us label the time from when the room has some positive value all the way 
till its production/consumption on New Year’s Eve as the service’s valuable life, 
signifying the time span when the service holds some value to some customer 
somewhere. Figure 1 illustrates a typical difference between a good and a service. 
Accordingly, the service can be sold at any time during its valuable life (i.e. selling at (1) 
in figure 1). However, while it is sold at a different time, the very act of producing a 
service for a customer requires the source to be present, either as man or machine. This 
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means that the production and consumption of a service is simultaneous, as it is widely 
established (Rathmell 1974; Regan 1963; Johnson 1970; Bateson 1977). Once the room 
is produced and consumed on New Year’s Eve, it is perished, and its valuable life ends. 
Since the service can only be sold during its valuable life, and its valuable life ends at the 
production of the service, it can then be concluded that services can only be sold before 
production (and consumption, since both are simultaneously held). This is an important 
point because it alludes to a key difference between services and goods. Whilst goods 
can also be sold before production, goods firms retain a choice of whether to sell before 
or after production. This choice is not available to services. 
<Take in Figure 1> 
 It must become clearer now that the issue of pricing in service is therefore the 
issue of advanced pricing, even though the time in advance may be mere minutes e.g. the 
purchase of a movie ticket just before the movie (cf. Edgett and Parkinson 1993) (i.e. at 
(3) in figure 1).  
 
Stylized Fact 1: The perishability and inseparability of services results in all sale of services to be 
advanced sale and pricing of services to be advanced pricing 
 
 As figure 1 shows, the inventory of a good is with the seller after production 
and before delivery and with the buyer after taking delivery until consumption. Since 
services are intangible, there is no question of inventory in the exchange. Rather, if the 
service customer buys in advance, he faces several risks, which I would elaborate below. 
 Since production and consumption is simultaneous, the consumer is unable to 
buy in advance to store and consume at some later date. The consumer can only buy in 
advance and consume later. Similarly, the firm can only sell in advance and produce 
later. This is an important point. Conventional economic wisdom informs us that we 
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buy only when the utility we attach to consuming the product outweighs the price we 
are supposed to pay for it. However, normative economics and marketing literature 
often implicitly assumes that buyers receive utility at the time of purchase. Since there is 
now a separation of time between purchase and consumption, it implies that the 
consumer’s utility is truly obtained not at the time of purchase, but at the time of 
consumption (cf. Shugan & Xie, 2000). Why is this significant? When there is a 
separation of purchase and consumption, there is a probability that a buyer who has 
purchased may not be able to consume, or as academics would term it – the utility 
becomes state dependent (cf. Karni, 1983; Fishburn, 1974; Cook & Graham, 1977). Put 
simply, a buyer who buys a movie ticket an hour before the movie might find that he is 
unable to watch the movie when the time comes because he has fallen ill. How is this 
different from goods? After all, when a consumer buys a good, the consumption of his 
good is also dependent on his state at that time. The difference between a good and a 
service in this regard is that the goods consumer chooses the time (and the state) that is 
most suitable for consumption, after he has purchased the good e.g. taking a can of 
coke out of a fridge to drink on a hot day. This is possible because the good is not 
immediately perished upon production. The service consumer may not have such a 
luxury since he needs to buy the service first and then consume later, when the state is 
uncertain. The application of state dependent utility theory into service research was 
first proposed by Shugan and Xie (2000), when they investigated spot and advance 
pricing decisions and the optimality of advanced selling.  
 It is important to note that the utility of the service buyer may not drop to zero. 
It might be that the state of the world has rendered the consumption of the service less 
valuable e.g. an open-air concert under the rain. Since the buyer faces uncertainty in 
ascertaining the value of the service at the time of consumption, the buyer faces a risk, 
which I term as valuation risk.  
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Stylized Fact 2: Due to the inseparability of productions and consumption, and the separation of 
purchase and consumption, the (advanced) pricing of services would need to take into account the 
valuation risk faced by buyers 
 
 Of course, to mitigate valuation risk, buyers would choose the time when it is 
most conducive for consumption and would typically turn up to buy seconds before 
consumption. I label this time as spot time. However, as many service firms operate 
with capacity constraints, buyers may not be able to obtain the service if they all show 
up at that time. Accordingly, if a buyer waits to buy only at spot time, he faces the 
uncertainty that the service may not be available, and I term this risk as unavailability risk. 
To alleviate that risk, he may be willing to purchase further in advance of consumption, 
as insurance (Png 1989), i.e. at (2) in figure 1. Previous literature in advanced selling has 
shown that advanced purchase is common in many service industries for this reason 
(Lee and Ng, 2001; Shugan and Xie, 2000, Xie and Shugan, 2001). Consequently, buyers 
who wish to be sure of obtaining a service would buy in advance. 
 
Stylized Fact 3: Short-term capacity constraints result in buyers facing uncertainty in the service being 
available, if they choose to buy at consumption time. The pricing of services would need to take into 
account the unavailability risk faced by buyers 
 
 Technically, both the purchase further in advance and the purchase at spot is 
deemed as advanced purchase as proposition 1 has explained. However, for purpose of 
clarity, I term purchases close to consumption as spot purchases, and purchases further 
in advance as advanced purchase, consistent with the terminology used by extant 
literature on this phenomenon. In reality, as elaborated by Lee and Ng (2001), the point 
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where advanced purchase ends and spot purchase begins is industry specific and is also 
dependent on ‘rate fences’ erected by the seller. Rate fences are constraints or 
conditions imposed by service firms to ensure minimal cannibalization of purchase. 
Consequently, the service industry is a host to a wide range of advanced prices also 
called “forward prices, pre-paid vouchers, super saver prices, advance ticket prices, early 
discounted fares, early bird specials, early booking fares, and advance purchase 
commitments” (Xie and Shugan, 2001). 
 Clearly, there is a trade off between the buyer’s unavailability risk and valuation 
risk. Hence, there would exist a market for selling the service in far in advance for 
buyers who would like to ensure that the service is available, regardless of whether the 
seller is willing to sell to this market. Similarly, there would also exist a market for selling 
at (close to) consumption time, for buyers who would like to ensure that they are able 
to consume.  
 As illustrated in figure 1, the trade-off between unavailability risk (which drives 
consumers willingness to buy further in advance) and valuation risk (which drives 
consumers willingness to buy closer to consumption) means that the distribution of 
demand across the valuable life of the service becomes important in the firm’s pricing 
decision. In this respect, the firm faces uncertainty in demand distribution across time – 
if they sell too much too early at too low a price, they may lose the opportunity to earn 
higher revenue from transient or last- minute customers but if they sell too little in 
advance, they may be saddled with unused capacity. To many revenue management 
consultants, accurate demand forecasting, coupled with dynamic optimization 
algorithms across time is key to better pricing decisions and higher profitability for 
service firms.  
 However, the pricing problem doesn’t end there. The firm’s decision on price 
would also have an effect on the buyers. For simplicity, let us assume that there exists 
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only two times in the service’s valuable life to sell – advanced time, denoting selling the 
service far in advance and spot time, denoting the selling of the service at a time close to 
consumption. If the advanced price is low, the discount from spot price might outweigh 
the valuation risk faced by spot buyers and similarly, if the spot price is low, advanced 
buyers might wait till spot to buy. Consequently, there is some degree of cross-time 
dependence between advanced and spot demand. Once this principle is extrapolated 
across multiple selling times in a service’s valuable life, one would probably appreciate 
the full extent of the firm’s complex pricing decision. 
 Finally, a crucial difference between pricing for services and goods is embedded 
in another effect of inseparability. Even if a buyer is to buy in advance, advanced selling 
requires the buyer to still present himself (or at least, the item that requires the service) 
at spot time. In other words, since services are inseparable in consumption and 
production, each advanced buyer has to ‘show-up’ to consume. Especially when the 
purchase is conditional upon a particular time of consumption, there would be a 
fraction of advanced buyers who may not be able to consume the service during the 
specified consumption time. This is commonly acknowledged in various revenue 
management literature, where attempts have been made to structure various reservation 
policies to minimize the impact of the cancellation and ‘no-show’ concept of advanced 
selling. (e.g. Alstrup et al. 1986; and Belobaba 1989; Hersh and Ladany 1978; Lieberman 
and Yechiali 1978; Rothstein 1971, 1974, 1985; Thompson 1961; Toh 1985). What has 
not been discussed is that the existence of a non-zero probability of non-consumption 
by advanced buyers provides a service firm with a unique opportunity not presented to 
goods firm i.e. the ability to sell the capacity that was already sold in advance – again at 
spot. This re-selling capability may then translate into additional profit for the firm 
either in the additional spot sales or overselling beyond the firm’s capacity in advance. If 
this sounds distinctively implausible, let me illustrate this point through two examples. 
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First, tow truck services operate with limited capacity but sell (albeit at a very low price) 
through the AA (automobile association) an enormously large number of its services in 
advance. Since the fraction of the market that actually require a tow truck service may 
be low, the firm obviously oversells its capacity in advance as well as re-sells them at 
spot (at a high price for those who did not buy in advance). Second, IT support services 
are usually oversold to buyers in advance, since the fraction of non-consumption may 
be high. 
 The implications on the pricing decision are enormous. Depending on the 
demand distribution across time, the level of non-consumption and capacity, firms 
might be prepared to manipulate advanced and spot prices to optimize profits.  
 
Stylized Fact 4: Separation of purchase and consumption due to the inseparability of services result in a 
non-zero probability of advanced buyers not consuming, thus freeing up of capacity to be re-sold at spot. 
Pricing decisions have to take into account the non-consumption effect. 
  
 In the following section of this paper, I examine this advanced sale 
phenomenon, given the above propositions, through the development of a theoretical 
model. Few literature have investigated this phenomenon. Shugan and Xie (2000) 
showed that due to the state dependency of service utility, buyers are uncertain in 
advance and become certain at spot while sellers remain uncertain of buyer states at 
spot because of information asymmetry. They suggest that advance selling overcomes 
the informational disadvantage of sellers and is therefore a strategy to increase profit. 
Xie and Shugan (2001) studied when advance selling improve profits and how advanced 
prices should be set. They have also investigated the optimality of advanced selling, 
investigating selling in a variety of situations, buyer risk aversion, second period arrivals, 
limited capacity, yield management and other advanced selling issues.  
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 Png (1989) showed that costless reservations in advance is a profitable pricing 
strategy as it induces truth revelation on the type of valuation that consumer has for the 
service (which is private information). If the consumer has a high valuation i.e. able to 
consume, he would exercise the reservation and pay a higher price. If not, the consumer 
would not exercise. In another paper, Png (1991) compared the strategies of charging a 
lower price for advanced sale and attaching a price premium at the date of consumption 
versus charging advanced buyers a premium and promising a refund to advanced 
buyers should consumption prices be lower than what was purchased.  
 However, despite various literature modeling the phenomenon, there has been 
no attempt to uncover the theoretical foundations that drive the primitive consumer 
behavior of advanced selling i.e. the notion of why advanced and spot demand exists, or 
how demand dynamics function within this domain. Although the above literature 
model sellers’ pricing strategies on advance selling, the fundamental aspect of pricing 
lies in demand behavior. This demand behavior, particularly in the advanced selling 
context, should not be exogenous and needs to be understood in at least two 
dimensions. First, as modeled by Xie-Shugan, Shugan-Xie and Png, it is important to 
understand the way buyers react to changes in prices by their choice of buy, not-buy or 
switch to buy at a different time. Second, it is also important to know how many would 
decide on each of the choices. In the latter, the heterogeneity of buyers is a necessary 
factor and has yet to be studied. 
 In studying this phenomenon therefore, three primary differences are 
highlighted between this study and those above. First, I do not model the individual 
consumer as one (or more) set of homogeneous consumers. Instead, I model the 
consumers as heterogeneous, through the use of demand functions. By modeling the 
consumers’ price sensitivity, I capture both the decision of buyers to buy or not to buy 
as well as the quantities of each choice at a given price. Second, I also model the 
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substitutability between advanced and spot demands, capturing the buyers switching 
decision, as well as the quantities that switch for a change in price. Finally, the model 
explicitly captures the probability of advanced buyers not being able to consume at the 
time of consumption and I analyze how this impacts on pricing. Through this model, it 
is hoped there will be greater applicability in the characterization of the phenomenon.  
 This study extends the previous paper in chapter 2 of this dissertation (i.e. Lee 
and Ng, 2001). Chapter 2 proposed an advanced selling model and studied the 
optimality of advanced selling and the optimal prices and capacities for advanced sale 
and at the time of consumption. In that model, it was implicitly assumed that all 
advanced buyers are able to consume at the time of consumption, and that only such 
buyers are captured within the demand functions. Furthermore, the model assumed that 
demand at spot is independent of advanced price. In this study, I relax both the 
assumptions by explicitly modeling advanced buyers probability of non-consumption, 
and by incorporating the interdependency between the demands at spot and advanced 
time.  
 All proofs of propositions are found in the appendix. 
 
MODEL 
I now proceed to specify the model. The following is defined: 
PA =  Price per unit of the service sold at advanced time where  
P0 = Price per unit of the same service sold at spot where  
π = Profits to the service firm 
qA = Quantity of service demanded by the market at advanced time 
q0 = Quantity of service demanded by the market at spot 
K = Capacity of the service firm and 0>K  
At  = Advanced time 
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0t  =  Spot time 
 A service sold in advance and at the time of consumption is not unlike two 
firms selling products differentiated only by the time of sale. The difference is that since 
there is only one service firm, the profit maximized is derived from demand at both 
times. Consequently, we can adapt product differentiation models derived in economics 
literature.  Following  Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), we assume the following 
demand structure for selling the service at At  and 0t  : 
APPq δβα +−= 00  
0PPq AA δβα +−=  
where 0>β , 0>δ  and δβ >  
 Forms of this demand curve have been used in marketing modeling literature 
e.g. Mcguire and Staelin (1985), who modeled the decision of two manufacturers and 
their choice to intermediate when the demand faced by both are represented by linear 
demand functions similar to that modeled above, and Ingene and Parry (1995) who 
modeled two competing retailers also facing similar demand functions, and how a 
manufacturer would coordinate the channels. 
Capacity and State effect 
 The parameter δ  depicts the effect of increasing AP  on 0q  and increasing 0P  
on Aq . The assumption δβ >  means that the effect of increasing 0P ( AP ) on 0q ( Aq ) 
is larger than the effect of the same increase in AP ( 0P ). This is a reasonable 
assumption because the price of a service may be more sensitive to a change in the 
quantity at its own time than to a change in the quantity across time, in other words, to 
borrow the terminology used in models of this nature, own-time effect dominates 
cross-time effect. This could be due to several reasons. Since the services are 
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differentiated by time of sale, the time difference may create other uncertainties to the 
buyers and thereby result in a lower cross time effect. 
 Note that the parameter δ , in the context of advanced selling of services, can 
be deemed to capture the valuation and unavailability risks faced by buyers. This means 
that a change in spot price would have an impact on advanced demand and the degree 
of impact is dependent on the magnitude of δ . It is assumed, for convenience, that the 
demand functions are symmetric across time. This assumption will be relaxed later. 
Thus, if the unavailability and valuation risks are low, δ may increase implying that 
there is increased substitutability between buying in advance and at spot. 
 I parameterize the probability that a buyer who buys in advance, but is unable 
to consume as ρ  where 10 << ρ . Note that the portion of demand sold in advance 
who are unable to consume at 0t  can be equivalently depicted as Aqρ . This capacity 
could be re-sold to buyers at spot, and at the spot price of 0P , yielding a revenue of 
AqP ρ0  to the firm (the assumption of full ability of the firm to re-sell relinquished 
capacity will be relaxed further on in the study). Finally, the firm may be constrained by 
its overall capacity i.e. Kqq A ≤+0 .  
 Given the situation described above, the objective function of the service firm 
becomes: 
][ 0, 0 KqqMax AppA ≤+π   where AAA qPqPqP ρπ 000 ++=  
 In summary, I include into the model the specificities of services in the 
following manner: 
1. The existence of advanced demand Aq , due to the credibility of capacity 
constraints, as well as the existence of demand at spot due to valuation risk 
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2. The substitutability parameter, δ , which I interpret as cross-time 
substitutability, and which captures the trade off between demand reaction to 
the two types of risks in the market. 
3. The ability of services to re-sell capacity sold at At  and not consumed at 0t  
The following are the model assumptions.  
1. While I model the proportion of non-consuming buyers, I assume that this 
proportion, together with the consumer demand parameters, is common 
knowledge to the firm and the market i.e. there is full information. 
2. The marginal costs of providing the service is negligible as service firms in 
general operate with high fixed costs. This is consistent with research in this 
area (e.g. Kimes 1989; Desiraju and Shugan 1999).  
3. The capacity has no salvage value after production/consumption. 
4. The service under study is a pure service (with no goods attributes). This means 
that the consumer, after consumption, has no ownership of anything tangible. 
This is as opposed to a good/service mix where the consumer, after 
consumption, may also own a good (e.g. a seminar with course materials). The 
re-selling issue may not apply to the ‘good’ part of the product since the 
consumer may not return it after buying in advance. 
5. Prices at spot and in advance are positive i.e. 0, 0 >PPA .  
6. The firm can credibly commit to spot prices in advance (cf. Xie and Shugan, 
2001) 
7. Buyers who buy in advance are guaranteed the availability of capacity at time of 
consumption. 
8. Capacity relinquished by advanced buyers can be fully re-sold at spot (this 
assumption is relaxed in the next section) 
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9. The service is not transferable. 
10. The firm is a monopoly. 
 
 The Xie-Shugan model depicts the phenomenon as a two-period process where 
homogeneous consumers arriving in period 1 can decide to buy or wait after the firm 
announces their spot and advance prices. Consumers may also arrive in period 2. In 
reality, buyers are not merely heterogeneous in their valuation of the service (i.e. own 
time price sensitivity). They are also heterogeneous in their willingness to switch 
between spot and advanced time (cross time sensitivity).   
 In Png’s model, the advance buyer, should he chooses to buy, knows how 
much he values the service only at the time of consumption. The probability of the 
buyer turning out to be a low or high valuation customer is depicted as λ  (in Xie-
Shugan, it’s q). This model incorporates this feature with ρ . If the buyer is able to 
consume, he is deemed to be a high valuation buyer. If he is unable to consume, he is 
deemed to have a low valuation. However, a key difference is that Png assumes a low 
valuation customer obtains a low valuation regardless if he is able to consume i.e. if he 
consumes, he receives a low valuation and if he does not, he will enjoy a low valuation 
net of any price paid for the alternative (p.250). Although it may not make a difference 
to the customer who obtains a low valuation regardless, his willingness to consume the 
service has a direct effect on the firm. If he does not consume, the capacity can be 
relinquished and re-sold. This ability to re-sell obviously impacts on the price of the 
service, both in advance and at spot. In all of Png, Xie-Shugan and Shugan-Xie’s 




 When capacity is higher than optimal demand (interior solution), the constraint 
is non-binding and I provide the following lemma as a benchmark: 
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απ −=  which we denote as )0(
*π . 
 If the fraction of non-consumption capacity is zero 0=ρ , i.e. all advance 
buyers are able to consume, prices and quantities sold at 0t  and At  would be the same, 
due to the symmetric demand functions. As I have argued previously, ρ  will always 
take on a positive value. Consequently, prices and quantities at 0t  and At  start 
diverging, as the following proposition show: 
 
 





+> , the firm derives a higher profit by lowering 
advanced price and increasing spot price, obtaining higher advanced demand and 
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derives a higher profit by increasing both advanced price and spot price, obtaining 
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 As every unit of advanced demand provides an opportunity to the firm to re-
sell, the firm chooses to lower *AP  to obtain higher advanced demand when price 





+> . Due to cross time sensitivity, a lower *AP  
decreases spot demand. However, instead of compensating by lowering *0P  to obtain 
higher spot demand, the firm chooses to increase *0P  instead since resold capacity can 
be sold at a premium and the marginal revenue from re-selling capacity at a premium 
(through higher *0P ) is higher than marginal revenue derived from increasing spot 
demand through a lower *0P . A graphical representation of the above can be seen in 
figure 2. However, when own-time price sensitivity is very low relative to cross-time 









⋅ , both advanced and spot prices 
increase with the probability of non-consumption because the cross-time effect of an 
increase in spot price causes a high advanced demand, sufficient to negate a reduction 
in advanced price. The net effect is that both advanced and spot prices increase. Notice 
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that a positive advanced price is conditional on
)4(
2
2ρδβ −⋅> . This means that the 
ability of a firm to obtain positive revenue from selling in advance is dependant on the 
degree of own-time price sensitivity vis-à-vis the cross-time price sensitivity. 
Furthermore, S  exists only when 0>ρ . Thus, while the terms proceeding S  
determine the level of increase or decrease in prices and quantities, we can intuitively 
label S  as the non-consumption effect attributable to the advanced purchase of services. 
<Take in Figure 2> 
 To highlight the impact on profit, the difference in expected profits (after some 
manipulation) can be written as 
Lemma 2:  































   
  
 The first term is the added profit due to double selling the fraction of non-
consuming capacity, )0(qρ . The second shows that the capacity that is double-sold is 
sold with a price premium of [ ]βρδβ +−⋅ )(2S . The third term shows that the 
advanced demand also increases, amplified by the combination of both own-time and 
cross-time sensitivities i.e. [ ]βρδβ ++⋅ )(2S . This amplification is because advanced 
demand is made higher through both a higher spot price and a lower advanced price. 
The fourth term shows that the increase in advanced demand also enjoys the same price 
premium. Finally, the fifth term captures the loss in revenue as a result of a lower 
advanced price and a lower spot demand.  
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 Lemma 1 is consistent with Xie-Shugan’s model where it was shown that when 
marginal cost is low and capacity constraint is non-binding, advance and spot prices are 
the same. However, unlike Xie-Shugan, the findings show that advanced prices may be 
lower even when marginal costs are zero as the presence of ρ  creates the divergence in 
advance and spot prices. Clearly, the potential revenue from one unit of advanced sale is 
higher than that from spot sale. Therefore, advance price decreases to generate a higher 
advanced demand. The cross time effect of this is an even higher spot price. 
 As ρ  increases, firm has greater incentive to price AP  lower to stimulate 
advanced demand. This amplifies the decrease in spot demand, pushing 0P  even 
higher. 
 












ρρρρδβ , the greater the probability of 
non-consumption, the higher (lower) the quantity sold in advance (at spot) and the 























 In Png’s model, a strategy of selling firm advance order does not maximize 
profit because the advanced buyer is unwilling to pay a higher price due to unavailability 
and valuation risk. Yet, a firm advanced order usually guarantees availability and as Xie-
Shugan model showed, firm advance orders can be optimal.  In addition, Png’s model 
does not take into account the fact that a buyer who buys in advance has a non-zero 
probability of not consuming and that non-consumption frees up the capacity to be re-
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sold. By modeling in non-consumption, I show that the potential revenue from 
advanced sales increases and it may be optimal for the firm to sell in advance. 
 Png’s model also showed that the seller’s revenue from spot sales is zero 
because buyers would prefer the non-contingent alternative in advance rather than wait 
till spot where the seller would extract all the consumer’s surplus (i.e. high price). Where 
the market is heterogeneous in the form of a demand function, the optimal price at spot 
assumes not all surpluses are extracted from everyone. Consequently, there is also 
heterogeneity in the degree to which customers may be willing to wait till spot or buy in 
advance. This implies that both spot and advanced demand would exist, with some 
degree of substitutability between buying at these two times, as modeled here. 
Accordingly, there is an optimal price at both times, as set out above in proposition 1. 
 
MODEL EXTENSION: OFFERING A REFUND WHEN THE ABILITY TO 
RE-SELL AT SPOT IS PROBABILISTIC  
  
 Providing refunds for buyer’s inability to consume is widely practiced in the 
airline industry. Casual enquiries by the author with airlines sales offices indicated that 
many airline tickets are sold with some refund value. Some tickets even provide a full 
100% refund to the customer. Generally, a full refund means that the ticket purchased 
can be returned to the airline for a full reimbursement of the price at any time – even 
after the proposed date of travel. This means that if the buyer cannot make a flight for 
any reason, the airline is fully prepared to return the price of the air ticket to the 
customer without any penalty fee, no questions asked. Furthermore, many airlines allow 
a refund on non-utilized sectors, e.g. if you have purchased a return ticket but only 
utilized one leg of the ticket.  
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 There is a fundamental difference between a full refund of this nature and those 
given out by retail shops for goods purchased or by service firms after the consumption 
of the service. In the latter, the refund is given (or promised) if the firm fails the 
consumer i.e. the compensation is provided to the buyer due to firm’s failure to deliver 
the benefits, according to the buyer’s perception. In the former, and also the focal point 
of this study, refunds are promised for buyer failure i.e. when the buyer fails to consume 
the service, through no fault of the firm. Here, the buyer does not even have the basis 
to complain about the service, since he has not consumed it. Yet, current airline 
practices show that the firm still provides him with the refund.  
 Png’s (1989) model attempted to shed some light into this behavior. While he 
found that firm advance orders are not optimal, his study showed the profit maximizing 
strategy is to insure the risk averse customer by compensating him when his valuation 
low and charging him high when his valuation is high. Thus the optimal result was a 
costless reservation at advanced time for all advanced buyers and a higher price for the 
high valuation customer at spot with the low valuation buyer not exercising the 
reservation. In this way, the advanced buyer is fully insured against capacity 
unavailability, and partially insured against his valuation at spot time. However, this 
strategy requires the advanced buyer to face the risk of capacity being unavailable at the 
time of consumption. In other words, Png’s advanced buyer does not actually buy the 
service; he merely buys the option of buying the service at the time of consumption, at 
a stipulated price i.e. a price option. This is in contrast to the buyer failure refund of the 
type illustrated above where it is clear that the buyer buys with a firm advance order 
(where capacity is guaranteed) with a refund in the event of a low valuation.  
 Consequently, I extend the model to investigate the circumstances where the 
firm may have to provide a refund, r, as a fraction of the advanced price. The firm 
could be compelled to provide r due to reasons such as competition. The question I 
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attempt to answer is whether the firm could benefit from that provision. I assume that 
there is a speculative market at At  such that it prohibits the firm from providing any 
refund above a full refund i.e. 10 ≤< r . In addition, the condition of the firm’s ability 
to re-sell the service at spot is relaxed and I introduce µ , the probability of the firm 
being able to re-sell relinquished capacity at spot. For this extension, no assumption is 
made on the impact of r on demand. While it might be possible that a refund offer may 
increase advanced demand, I do not assume that here. Hence, the demand functions 
could be seen as demand faced by the firm already with the refund offer into the 
market.  
 Definitions: 
RAP ,  =  Price per unit of the service sold at advanced time, with a full refund 
offer  
RP ,0  = Price per unit of the same service sold at spot 
Rπ  = Profit to the service firm when a refund is offered to advanced buyers 
RAq ,  = Quantity of service demanded by the market at advanced time 
Rq ,0  = Quantity of service demanded by the market at spot 
r  = Refund (if offered) by the firm where 10 ≤< r  
µ  = Probability of capacity relinquished by advance buyers being re-sold at 
spot 
 
 I model the firm’s decision through an extensive form game (shown in figure 3), 
with perfect information but uncertain, with nature deciding if the firm is or isn’t able to 
re-sell the relinquished capacity sold in advance. 




 First, let’s consider the impact of µ , if the firm does not need to offer a refund 
i.e. 0=r . From proposition 2, an increase in probability of non-consumption ρ  
decreases advanced prices and increase spot prices overall. However, for a given ρ , if 
µ  is low, the impact of ρ  is lessened even if ρ  is high. The presence ofµ  therefore 
reverses the effect of ρ . When the firm has a low probability of re-selling at spot 
market, advanced prices increase because the inability to sell reduces the firm’s incentive 
to price lower and stimulate the advanced market. Thus, prices in advance increase and 
spot prices decrease. To the extent that if 0→µ , )0(, **,0*, PPP RRA → .  
 From the game tree in Figure 3, r=0 is a first best solution. However, when is it 
more profitable for the firm if a refund has to be offered (i.e. second-best)? The firms’ 
profit would be higher with a refund offer when: 
]}[{]}[{ norefundrefund EMaxEMax ππ >  
 The proposition below illustrates the benefit of offering a refund: 
Proposition 3:  The firm obtains higher profit when a refund is offered if and only if the cross-time 








   and 10 << φ  for all permitted values of 10 << ρ  and 10 << µ  
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 Xie-Shugan showed that firm advanced orders with a refund offer may be 
optimal as the firm is able to obtain a higher price in advance to compensate for the 
cost of refund, as well as derive greater profits from cost savings in not having to serve 
these customers.  The above proposition shows that the firm may derive higher revenue 
from higher prices and/or expanded advanced demand with a refund offer. 
 If the cross-time sensitivity is low i.e. φβδ ⋅< , the refund offer increases 
profit. This is because when the cross time impact of a price change is low (i.e. less 
customer switching), a change in price at (advanced) spot time would have less an 
impact on (spot) advanced demand. Low cross time sensitivity implies state sensitive 
people are more concerned about a conducive state and won’t switch to advanced time 
even if the price is low. Similarly, capacity sensitive people are more concerned about 
obtaining the service, and won’t switch to spot time even if the spot price is low. 
Consequently, a refund offer effectively reduces the price paid for the advanced buyer 
who might not consume without any impact on the buyer who would consume. When 
cross time sensitivity is low, this reduction in price does not cause as many spot buyers 
to switch, hence the firm obtains higher profit from higher revenue in advance without 
losing much spot revenue. 
 
Proposition 4:  Where the values of µ  and ρ  are such that 0)1(2)1( >−−+ ρµρµρ , the 












 Since the firm is constrained by speculators, it cannot increase refund beyond 
giving a full refund. Thus, the above proposition spells out the level of cross-time 
sensitivity, below which the refund offered is a boundary solution of a full refund. As 
noted previously, the ability to re-sell capacity relinquished by advanced buyer 
contributes to the level of advanced price. Consequently, under the condition of full 
ability to re-sell, I find the following counter intuitive proposition: 
 
Proposition 5:  When 1=µ , ρ
δβ >  and refund is offered (under the condition in proposition3) 
and  










, ARA PP < . 
 
 In contrast to Png and Xie-Shugan models, the above proposition show that 
advanced price may be lower with a refund offer. This is because the firm derives 
higher revenue from two sources. First, the revenue from increased demand may 
outweigh the revenue from increased price. Second, with an expanded advanced 
demand, the potential revenue from non-consumption also increases. Consequently, 
when price sensitivity is high relative to cross-time sensitivity i.e. ρ
δβ > , the result 
could be pareto optimal where it is possible for the firm to provide the advanced buyer 
with insurance against capacity unavailability (through a positive advanced purchase 
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price), and insurance against valuation risk (through a refund offer), at a price that may 
be lower than if a refund was not offered.  
 
Asymmetric Cross-time Sensitivity 
 As noted earlier, the parameter δ , in the context of advanced selling of 
services, can be deemed to capture the trade off between valuation and unavailability 
risks. Clearly, they do not need to be the same i.e. 
APPq 000 δβα +−=  
0PPq AAA δβα +−=  
where 0>β  and 0,δδβ A>  
 To investigate the implications of asymmetry, I take two extreme examples i.e. 
0→Aδ  and 00 →δ . For simplicity, I assume no refund need to be provided and 
capacity relinquished by advanced buyers would be fully sellable i.e. 1=µ , r = 0. 
 
When 0→Aδ  
 In this case, advanced demand is not affected by spot prices. However, spot 
demand may be affected by prices in advance and at spot. This type of behavior can be 
typical of a market segment where capacity availability is extremely important. Such 
services may include those where the time of consumption is tied to the value of the 
service e.g. an important flight, a hotel room on New Year’s eve, anniversary dinner etc. 
In these cases, the advanced market cannot be persuaded to wait to buy at spot. If the 
price in advance is too high, they would seek alternatives at advanced time (and 
therefore drop out of the market) instead of switching to spot. I term this as a market 
that faces high unavailability risk. 
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When 00 →δ  
 In this case, spot demand is not affected by advance prices. However, advanced 
demand may be affected by prices in advance and at spot. This is type of behavior can 
be typical of a market segment where a conducive state for consumption (i.e. high 
valuation) is extremely important. Such services may include emergency services e.g. 
tow truck, or computer/equipment support services where the precise time the service 
is required is often not known. In these cases, the spot market cannot be persuaded to 
buy in advance (high valuation risk). If the price at spot is too high, they would seek 
alternatives at spot time (and therefore drop out of the market for the service). I term 
this as a market that faces high valuation risk. 
 In practice, a service firm can face a market with both high valuation and 
unavailability risk. For example, a flight from London to New York would be a service 
with high availability risk for a passenger that needs to get on a particular flight e.g. to 
attend his son’s graduation. He would therefore purchase in advance. If the price is too 
high, he would choose an alternative (perhaps another airline) but he would not 
consider waiting till spot, as he needs to be in New York at that particular date. In 
contrast, a business executive who does not know when he might be called to go on a 
business trip to New York would not be swayed to buy in advance, as he is unsure if he 
should be traveling on that date. 
 
Proposition 6:  A market that faces high unavailability (valuation) risk pays higher prices in 
advance (at spot) than a market that faces high valuation (unavailability) risk if 
ρ
δβ > . 
 While the above proposition is not surprising it is found that the firm’s profit 
from asymmetric states is not the same. Since high unavailability risk can increase 
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advanced price, it also serves to reduce advanced demand as a result of the increase in 
price. This would reduce the potential revenue from non-consumption. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 This study aims to offer a more applicable model of advanced selling as a 
phenomenon. In stylized fact 1, I justify why all services are sold in advance and that 
the pricing of services is in fact advanced pricing. In stylized facts 2 and 3, I proceed to 
explain how advanced demand may be distributed between a time further in advance 
until consumption due to the specificities of services, specifically through the 
heterogeneous levels of unavailability and valuation risks faced by the service consumer. 
In stylized fact 4, I illustrate one particular idiosyncratic factor of advanced selling in 
services i.e. the fact that advanced buyers may not be able to consume and thereby 
releasing the capacity to be re-sold by the firm at the time of consumption. Having 
conceptualize the factors which influence pricing in services, I then proceeded to model 
the phenomenon through a theoretical model incorporating consumer price sensitivity, 
degree of cross-time substitutability as well as the ability of the service firm to re-sell 
relinquished capacity at spot time to derive the optimal pricing and quantities.  
 The model presented found, in proposition 1 that advanced prices are lower 
than spot prices even without binding capacity constraints or marginal costs because the 
potential revenue from one unit of advanced sale is higher than that from spot sale. 
Proposition 2 showed that as the probability of non-consumption increases, advanced 
price decreases and spot prices increases further. This result may be applied to 
emergency or support services where buyers can buy in advance with very low 
probability of consumption. As noted earlier, an example of this would be breakdown 
services where buyers buy in advance but their consumption date is uncertain. What 
may be viewed as insurance could in fact be a form of advanced purchase at a very low 
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price. Without advanced purchase, the spot price of breakdown services would be high, 
as many who own older vehicles would attest. Another example of advanced purchase 
at a low price at a low probability of consumption would be the purchase of support 
services e.g. equipment or IT support. Such services are often sold to individuals or 
firms on an annual subscription basis. Again, without a support contract, the spot prices 
of such services are usually much higher. 
 The higher potential revenue from advanced demand diminishes, however, as 
the ability of the firm to sell relinquished capacity reduces. Services that required 
capacity scheduling or planning at the time of consumption such as removal or 
exhibition services may fall into this category, where spot and advanced prices may be 
the same. Yet, this proposition may accentuate the realization that such firms could 
explore creative pricing strategies or use technological advancements to improve overall 
profit through the ability to manipulate the parameters set out in this model.  
 For buyers who buy in advance but are unable to consume (i.e. buyer failure) I 
find, in proposition 3, that offering a refund could be more profitable when cross time 
sensitivity is low relative to own-time price sensitivity. This is because when cross time 
sensitivity is low, the firm benefits either from increase price and/ or increased 
advanced demand. Proposition 4 showed that a full refund may also be optimal under 
conditions of very high own-time price sensitivity relative to cross-time sensitivity. 
However, proposition 4 is a boundary solution. Consequently, if the firm is able to 
increase cross-time sensitivity, profit may be increased with an interior solution for r. A 
counter intuitive result was discovered in proposition 5, where a refund offered to 
advanced buyers could result in a lower advanced price than if refund was not offered. 
This occurs when the refund offer is able to expand demand to such a degree that it is 
optimal for the firm to lower its advanced price. 
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 Asymmetric conditions where unavailability and valuation risks are not equal are 
then investigated. Not surprisingly, I find in proposition 6 that advanced prices are 
higher when unavailability risks are high and spot prices are higher when valuation risks 
are high. That means that the perception of high valuation and high unavailability risks 
may be profitable for the firm. However, if the risks are too high, buyers may not buy. 
In practice, such risks may be manipulated by the firm through its pricing policies, for 
example, by providing some degree of flexibility in the time of consumption. Where the 
business executive facing high valuation risk in not being certain which date he is to fly, 
a flexible flight time might persuade him to buy in advance or lower his valuation risk, 
increasing his willingness to pay. Similarly, if the graduate’s father is given a ticket that 
allows him to choose a range of flight times thereby reducing his unavailability risk, he 
might be swayed to buy at the last minute or lower his perception of risk, which would 
in turn increase his willingness to pay. A summary of the results of the model can be 
seen in Table 1. 
<Take in Table 1> 
 This model also resolves the issue of risk aversion in buyers through the use of 
a demand function. Since buyers in advance are heterogeneous in their valuation of the 
service, their probabilities of non-consumption are also heterogeneous. As advanced 
buyers would also discount this uncertainty in their valuation, this ‘discount’ alludes to 
the buyers’ degree of risk aversion. The demand function, and its parameters, subsumes 
such complexities. The result is a parsimonious model that offers a theoretical 
framework on how service pricing could be approached.  
 
Revenue Management 
 The objective of revenue management studies is to maximize yield by managing 
the sale of service capacity over time, through pricing, capacity allocation, and timing of 
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sale (Badinelli and Olsen 1990; Desiraju and Shugan 1999). One of the limitations of 
current revenue management (RM) literature is that many RM models maximize 
payoffs/yield, given some forecasted demand profile that is largely exogenous, and does 
not explicitly capture the price/capacity relationship (e.g. Badinelli and Olsen 1990; 
Belobaba 1989; Bodily and Weatherford 1995; Hersh and Ladany 1978; Pfeifer 1989; 
Toh 1979). A widely used approach in this stream of literature is that of mathematical 
programming. Kimes (1989), however, commented “although the linear programming 
solution can be found, the assumption of deterministic demand makes the solution to 
the problem unrealistic”. The model developed here is based on demand functions 
across time, hence capturing fundamental concepts of consumer behavior (cf. Chase 
1999; Lieberman 1993; Relihan 1989).  
 The model can be applied in a non-linear programming approach, where the 
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 Essentially, the firm faces a demand function at any point in advance that 
incorporates some degree of substitutability between the price at that time and the 0t  
price. Each demand parameter is time dependent and the distribution of that parameter 
across time may be defined exogenously. The optimal price and quantity to be sold is 
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generated from the objective function that multiples the quantity sold at each time with 
the price at that time, cumulative across time. Each advanced time would also yield a 
fraction that may not consume at 0t  and that is accounted for in the objective function. 
Hence, the price and quantity relationship is captured explicitly as is the substitutability 
between times of purchase. Price discrimination, by a simple extension, can simply be 
incorporated into the model as the standard “affine” pricing schedule where the firm 
realizes a price premium at any point in time equivalent to the social surplus at the 
optimum at any time t. Similarly, multi-leg flights, 3 nights hotel stays etc. can be 
modeled in as a bundled product and its demand function ascertained accordingly. By 
using the demand function, a vast quantity of economic literature can be applied into 
the advanced selling context to produce richer insights into the strategy of advanced 
selling. 
 In the past, where pricing is often static, the above specification might have 
been difficult to implement. However, the advent of the connected economy, where 
data can be obtained quickly, technological innovations have made complicated 
algorithms possible to implement. Thus, a dynamic pricing model such as the one 
suggested above is not impossible. Furthermore, B2B and B2C marketplaces create new 
ways to exchange goods and services, and the firm has to innovate for higher revenues. 
What is left is the question of how many prices should the firm introduce to the market 
before it becomes confused (see Desiraju and Shugan, 1999). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this chapter is not merely an additional model of revenue 
management or to capture optimal pricing strategies. What I seek to show, by 
abstracting the phenomenon into this theoretical framework, is that the parameters 
modeled here provides the firm with various strategic levers to influence demand and 
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plan an effective pricing strategy. As noted earlier, degree of flexibility may affect the 
perception of risk. Depending on the type of service industry, further research and 
managerial creativity may find other levers that would manipulate the demand faced by 
the firm and provide the firm with unique opportunities for higher revenue. 
 It is fairly common knowledge that many low cost airlines price according to 
the amount of capacity available, increasing prices as the plane fills up, and according to 
demand forecast. Consequently, revenue management is capacity and forecast centered 
rather than value centered. Through the model, I aim to provide a more satisfying 
approach towards revenue management, as a practice. My contention is that the firm’s 
focus should not merely be on revenue management as it should be on revenue 
improvement. Thus, only when demand behavior is incorporated into the equation, 
providing a more complete picture, the firm would be able to understand where and 
how its revenue is being obtained. As our model has demonstrated, the offer of refund 
could increase profit for the firm. However, firms may misunderstand that refund is 
merely a form of providing ‘quality’ service and as such, might be tempted to drop the 
offer, as some low cost airlines do. In so doing, they miss the opportunity to derive 
higher profit either through expanded advanced demand or higher advanced price. 
 For several decades, developed economies have been service economies. The 
expansion of the service sector is partially attributed to an increase in the intangible 
component (often known as the service component) of the production of agricultural 
and industrial goods. Conversely, the past decade has also shown that certain service 
activities are embracing some degree of industrialization. The resultant convergence has 
prompted some scholars to propose that the service economy is moving into “an 
economy based on service relationship as a mode of coordination between economic 
agents” (Gallouj, 2002). As such an economy expands, faster than even academic 
analyses can hope to catch up with, fundamental questions gets left behind, to the 
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extent that they may become less fashionable to conduct research on, although the 
issues may be no less important. Such fundamental questions include, though not 
limited to, some basic differences between goods and services. As goods and services 
are becoming increasingly similar in nature (Gallouj, 2002), it is more important that 
their differences are addressed. Only when the difference between a good and a service 
is properly specified, can there be a greater understanding of the broader context in 
which a combination of a good and a service function. Further research could also 
explore pricing issues in the bundling of a good and a service, the costs of advanced 
selling, especially transaction costs, the impact of a binding capacity constraint (cf. Xie 
and Shugan, 2001) and the impact of competition on advanced selling strategies. 
 By abstracting the phenomenon of advanced pricing in services through a 
stylized model, I aim to provide a platform for a more thorough understanding of 
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Buyer-Seller Exchange for a Typical Good



















































Refund r needs to be 
offered 
Refund does not 
need to be offered 
Unable to re-sell 
µ−1  
AAAAA qrPqPqPqP ρρπ −++= 000  Able to re-sell µ  




Unable to re-sell 
µ−1  
AAAA qrPqPqP ρπ −+= 00  
AAA qPqPqP ρπ 000 ++=  
00qPqP AA +=π  
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Table 1: Summary of Results 
 








sell, µ  
Impact of 
increasing 
refund, r , if 
offered 
Asymmetry 
High unavailability risk 
= 0→Aδ  and High 







+>  When ρ
δβ >  
and 1=µ  
When ρ
δβ >  
Advanced 
Price 
Decrease Increase Decrease  Higher when 0→Aδ  than 
when 00 →δ   
Spot Price Increase Decrease Increase  Lower when 0→Aδ  than 
when 00 →δ  
Advanced 
Demand 
Increase Decrease Increase  Lower when 0→Aδ  than 
when 00 →δ  
Spot 
Demand 
Decrease Increase Decrease  Higher when 0→Aδ  than 
when 00 →δ  
Profit Increase Decrease Increase when 
φβδ ⋅<  (see 
proposition 3) 
Higher when 00 →δ  than 




Lemma 1:  
0PPq AA δβα +−=  (1) 
APPq δβα +−= 00   (2) 
and AAA qPqPqP ρπ 000 ++=  
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From (5) and (6) above, 0, *0
* >PPA  iff the denominator is positive which is when 
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Proposition 3:  
When 0>r  and 0>µ  
RRAA PPq ,0, δβα +−=  (13) 
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The expected profit if a refund is offered would be 
RARRARARRRARArefund qPqrPqPqPE ,,0,,,0,0,,][ ρµρπ +−+=  (25) 
  
In contrast, if a refund is not offered, the profit would be 
AAAnorefund qPqPqPE ρµπ 000][ ++=  (26) 
where 
RRARA PPq ,0,, δβα +−=  (13) 
RARR PPq ,,0,0 δβα +−=   (14) 
0PPq AA δβα +−=  (13a) 
APPq δβα +−= 00  (14a) 
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Therefore, the region where the inequalities would hold is (i) for all possible values of 
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C O N C L U S I O N  
 
 The issue of advanced selling and pricing for services warrants research 
attention as service economies mature and become more competitive. However, the 
cross-disciplinary nature of pricing deters many researchers from this area. 
Furthermore, the diversity of services results in many pricing variables and parameters 
being labeled differently across service industries. As a result of this contextualization 
within each industry, there is greater difficulty in collecting empirical data on pricing, 
especially across industries. Consequently researchers in service pricing require both 
experience and theoretical expertise in formulating a link between a conceptual 
understanding of service pricing and complex reality. However, this challenge is 
worthwhile to be undertaken as less mature service industries could profit from the 
experiences of more mature ones if the pricing concepts and strategies could be 
understood at a more abstract level. Further research in this area should aim to 
analyse pricing decisions across industries, to derive greater insights into the 
phenomenon. 
 This dissertation has highlighted a phenomenon that has not yet been rigorously 
examined in the academic context. Although the computational aspect of advanced 
selling (through revenue/yield management research) has been amply researched in the 
operations research, I aim to provide greater insight into service pricing that contributes 
both to operations research and pricing research in marketing. 
 
